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Originalism and Original Exclusions
Mark S. Stein'
In this article, I consider how the interpretation of today's Constitution should
be affected by the antebellum Constitution's accommodation of slavery and by
the limitation of the franchise, at the time of the antebellum Constitution, to a
small minority of the adult population. I refer to these defects in the antebellum
Constitution and the political system that produced it as "original exclusions."
In view of these original exclusions, the mere ratification of provisions of the
antebellum Constitution cannot imbue them with sufficient moral legitimacy
to override contemporary statutes. Thus, a justification for originalism based
on notions of popular sovereignty must fail. The original exclusions also
straightforwardly defeat the argument that originalism achieves desirable results
because the Constitution was produced under supermajoritarian voting rules. In
fact, as the Constitution is so hard to amend, and as there has been moralprogress
since the time of the antebellum Constitution, it makes sense to assume that the
original meaning of some remaining antebellum provisions is morally retrograde
and undesirable.
The progressive elimination of the original exclusions was accomplished, in part,
through nonoriginalist means and has increased the moral legitimacy of the
Constitution. As the moral legitimacy of the Constitution derives, in part, from
past nonoriginalism, future nonoriginalism should require less justification.
There are some cases in which the text or original meaning of a constitutional
provision was plausibly affected by an original exclusion. There are also cases
in which application of a constitutional provision specially affects a previously-
excluded class. If one or both of these conditions apply, the originalist position
becomes even weaker
i Academic Fellow, Harvard Law School, Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy,
Biotechnology, and Bioethics. J.D., University of Michigan, Ph.D.; Yale University. I acknowl-
edge with thanks the financial support of the Petrie-Flom Center and the comments of Dick
Fallon, Chris Robertson, and members of the Harvard Law School Legal Theory Reading
Group. Mistakes are my own.
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Most fundamentally, originalism is objectionable because it seeks to fix the meaning
of antebellum provisions in the legal andpoliticalculture thatproduced the original
exclusions.
INTRODUCTION
F ROM a contemporary perspective, the antebellum Constitution had
questionable moral legitimacy.' Only a small minority of the adult
population was able to participate in ratifying the Constitution or its
amendments. Among those excluded from the franchise were women,
African-American slaves, almost all Native Americans," and many poor
white males, who were excluded by property qualifications and poll taxes.'
The antebellum Constitution was produced by a slave society,6 and it
accommodated and protected slavery in several provisions. The fugitive
slave clause in Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution required that slaves
who escaped to a free state be returned to slavery;7 Article I, Section 9
prohibited Congress from banning the African slave trade until 1808;s
Article V prohibited any amendment of this provision before 1808;9 and the
Three-Fifths Clause in Article I, Section 2 increased the representation of
slave states in Congress and the electoral college beyond the representation
they would have received if slaves had not been counted. 10
2 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 18 HARv. L. REV. 1787 (2005)
(discussing the concept of moral legitimacy as applied to constitutions).
3 See Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist
Interpretation be Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482, 1498 n.44 (1985) (collecting sources and es-
timating that "roughly 2.5% of the population voted in favor of the Constitution's ratifica-
tion").
4 The issue of Native American suffrage is complicated, from the perspective of demo-
cratic theory, as Native Americans then enjoyed some degree of self-rule, as reflected in the
Constitution's reference to "Indians not taxed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. "Native Americans
apparently voted in parts of New England," but the general failure of states to offer the fran-
chise to Native Americans could be considered a democratic deficit. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR,
THE RIGHT TO VOTE: ThE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 406 n. I o
(2000).
5 The percentage of white males who were excluded is the subject of some uncertainty
and debate, and there were different suffrage rules in different states. See Simon, supra note
3, at 1498 n.44; AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 7 (2005). While
some states permitted free blacks to vote, Keyssar notes that "most free blacks could not meet
property and taxpaying requirements." KEYSSAR, supra note 4, at 55.
6 1 use the term "slave society" to refer to a society in which slavery exists.
7 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
9 U.S. CONST. art. V.
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; see also PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND
LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 3-36 (2d ed. 2001) (explaining that the Constitution also
contained a number of other provisions that directly or indirectly accommodated slavery).
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I refer to these defects in the antebellum Constitution and the political
system that produced it as "original exclusions." There has been surprisingly
little sustained discussion of how such original exclusions should bear
on the interpretation of the Constitution. Participants in the originalism
debate sometimes address these issues, but usually only in passing." In
this Article, I offer a broad and sustained treatment.
Many people, undoubtedly, have the intuition that the original exclusions
count against originalism as a theory of constitutional interpretation. I
share that intuition, and I try here to offer arguments that can support
and develop it. Yet in the end, at least some of these arguments must be
addressed, again, to moral intuition.
Originalists believe that courts should enforce as law the original
meaning of the 1787 Constitution and the original meaning of each
constitutional amendment. Nonoriginalists believe that courts need not
enforce original meaning. I follow Professor Mitchell Berman in identifying
as nonoriginalists those who would sometimes enforce original meaning
and sometimes not;12 originalism, as reflected in the views of self-identified
originalists, seems to admit few or no exceptions other than the possible
exception of precedent. 3
Nonoriginalism is a matter of occasion and a matter of degree.
Nonoriginalists may be prepared to depart from original meaning on some
occasions but not others, and they may be prepared to depart father from
original meaning on some occasions than on others. 14 Nonoriginalists need
not deny, and I do not deny, that courts should be constrained, to some
extent, by the language and original meaning of the Constitution."
ji The following provide important, but brief treatment: i BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE TIE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 316--19 (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATiONS
88-91 (1998); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REv.
204, 229-31 (198o); Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1132-33 (1998); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, A Pragmatic
Defense of Originalism, i oi Nw. U. L. REV. 383,394-96 (2007); Simon, supra note 3, at 1498.
Two recent and important sustained treatments, from a nonoriginalist perspective, are
R. George Wright, Originalism and the Problem of Fundamental Fairness, 91 MA o. L. REV. 687
(2Oo8) and Malla Pollack, Dampening the Illegitimacy of the United States' Government: Refraining
the Constitution from Contract to Promise, 42 IDAHO L. REV. 123 (2005). Wright and Pollack are
most concerned with what I call exclusion-specific nonoriginalism. See infra Part IV.
12 Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 19-20 (zoo9). Originalists
disagree among themselves as to whether they should follow nonoriginalist precedent. See in-
fra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
13 See Berman, supra note 12, at 19-20; see also infra notes 182-83 and accompanying
text.
14 Part IV, infra, illustrates these points with respect to the impact on previously ex-
cluded groups of constitutional provisions affected by the original exclusions.
15 Suppose that the original meaning of the First Amendment would not protect the
burning of an American flag as a means of protest, so that Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989),
and United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (I 99o), are nonoriginalist decisions. To endorse
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There are a number of divisions among originalists. Some would enforce
the original intent of the framers,16 others the original understanding of the
ratifiers, 17 and still others-now probably the dominant group-the original
"public meaning."" I use the term "original meaning" to embrace all three
possibilities.
Originalism has long been associated with a politically conservative
outlook.19 More recently, the legal academy has seen the growth of liberal
originalism 0 and libertarian originalism.' However, originalist judges still
tend to be conservative; the two self-avowed originalists on the Supreme
these nonoriginalist decisions is not to say that the First Amendment can be interpreted as
meaning anything at all. For example, endorsement of these cases would not imply that the
First Amendment can be interpreted as guaranteeing the right to health care.
I6 See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693,
694-95, 706 (1976); RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY: TE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
17 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 36 (1999) ("ratifying intent") [hereinafter
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599,610 (2OO4) [hereinafter Whittington, TheNew Originalism]. Madison
himself expressed some support for this view. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas
Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), in 3 THtE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 447-48
(Max Farrand ed., 1966) ("[lf a key is to be sought elsewhere [than the text itself], it must be
not in the opinions or intentions of the Body which planned & proposed the Constitution, but
in the sense attached to it by the people in their respective State Conventions where it recd.
all the authority which it possesses.").
18 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, 'ME TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 144 (I990); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 3 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a
Civil-Law System]; Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291,
304 (2007); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 Loy. L. REV. 61 I, 627-28
(i999); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 853 (1989) [herein-
after Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil]; Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, I1l. Pub. L.
Research Paper No. 07-24 (2oo8), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1120244.
19 See, e.g., BERGER, Supra note 16; BORK, supra note 18; Rehnquist, supra note 16.
20 Jack Balkin has recently embraced the originalist label while retaining liberal views.
See Balkin, supra note 18; Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103
Nw. U. L. REV. 549,550-59 (2009) [hereinafter Balkin, Framework Originalism].
Bruce Ackerman and Ronald Dworkin have been referred to by others as liberal
originalists, but they have not self-identified as such. Akhil Amar has come close to embracing
the label. See Akhil R. Amar, Rethinking Originalism, SLATE, Sept. 2I, 2005, http://www.slate.
com/id/21 z668o/.
21 Randy Barnett is the most well-known libertarian originalist. See RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: TIE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89-130 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION]; Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 405 (2007) [hereinafter Barnett, Underlying Principles]; Randy E. Barnett,
Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as it Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257
(zoo 5 ) [hereinafter Barnett, Trumpeting Precedent]; Barnett, supra note 18.
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Court are Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas."2
A major issue that divides originalists is to what extent the original
meaning of a constitutional provision includes the original expected
application of that provision.13  To some extent, the dispute between
expected-applications originalists and unexpected-applications originalists
(as I will call the two camps) 4 divides originalists along ideological lines.
Conservative originalists are more likely to believe that original meaning
includes original expected application, while liberal and libertarian
originalists are more likely to deny that original meaning includes original
expected application.
Closely related to the issue of whether original meaning includes original
expected applications is the issue of how nonoriginalist constitutional law
has become. Until recently, both originalists and nonoriginalists seemed to
agree that vast areas of Supreme Court doctrine were nonoriginalist. There
were attempts by originalists to justify Brown v. Board of Education5 on
originalist grounds, 6 but originalists did not seek to justify constitutional
doctrine in general; they sought to critique constitutional doctrine.
22 Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, supra note 18; Clarence Thomas,
Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. I, 1-7 (1996).
23 The following scholars, among others, oppose the inclusion of expected applications:
Balkin, supra note 18, at 292-93; Barnett, Underlying Principles, supra note 21, at 410; Solum,su-
pra note 18, at 2o. Balkin and Barnett both credit Ronald Dworkin with clearly elucidating the
distinction between original meaning and original expected application. See Ronald Dworkin,
Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at I 15, tI6.
The following scholars are, most or all of the time, in favor of including expected applica-
tions: Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 129, 1 48-49
[hereinafter Scalia, Response]; John 0. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive
Principles as the Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371 (2007) [hereinafter McGinnis
& Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles]; John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case against Construction, 103
Nw. U. L. REV. 751 (2009) [hereinafter McGinnis & Rappaport, OriginalMethods Originalism];
see also Jed Rubenfeld, Reply to Commentators, I 15 YALE L.J. 2093, 2099 (zoo6).
Some unexpected-applications originalists frame the issue as whether we should be
bound by original expected applications as well as by original meaning. Balkin, supra note 18,
at 292-93; Solum, supra note 18, at 20. Expected-applications originalists, however, do not
accept this framing; they insist that original expected applications are part of original meaning.
Scalia, Response, supra, at i44, 148-49.
24 These are ugly neologisms, but I think they are clearer than some alternative possible
terms.
25 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
26 BORK, supra note 18, at 82; see also Michael W McConnell, Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, 8i VA. L. REV. 947, 957-60 (i995). McConnell's innovative originalist
justification for Brown was based on behavior of political actors subsequent to the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. It provoked an important exchange with Professor Michael
Klarman. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response
to Professor McConnell, 8I VA. L. REV. 188I, 1882-85, 1928-36 (1995); Michael W McConnell,
The Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 8I VA. L. REV. 1937, 1938,
1954-550(995)-
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It is probably still the majority view that a great deal of constitutional
doctrine is nonoriginalist. In a much-cited account, Professor Henry
Monaghan concludes that "no acceptable version of original understanding
theory can yield a convincing descriptive account of the major features of
our 'Bicentennial Constitution': nontextual guarantees of civil liberties; a
powerful,presidentiallycentered national government; a huge administrative
apparatus; and national responsibility for what had long been conceived of
either as local responsibilities or as not the responsibility of government
at all." 7 Professor Richard Fallon, likewise, concludes that "a great deal
of existing constitutional doctrine-including much that we are likely to
think most important-cannot be justified on originalist principles."' 8 As
examples of reigning nonoriginalism, Fallon mentions First Amendment
doctrine and equal protection doctrine as applied to both state and federal
governments. 9
With the growth of unexpected-applications originalism, there are now
more ambitious attempts to reconcile originalism with current doctrine.
Professor Jack Balkin argues that the constitutional protection of abortion is
justified on originalist grounds.30 Professor Lawrence Solum suggests that
there may be no cases of "full inconsistency" between a Supreme Court
decision and the original semantic meaning of the Constitution; in the few
cases of partial inconsistency, he suggests, the Court's opinion could be
rewritten to achieve the same result by relying on other provisions of the
Constitution.3"
For purposes of this Article, I will assume the traditional conception of
original meaning, under which original meaning includes a fair amount of
original expected application. In the Conclusion, I will revisit the issue and
consider how various arguments based on the original exclusions apply to
unexpected-applications originalism.
This Article is part of the literature on the "countermajoritarian
difficulty,"3 as well as part of the originalism debate. I will use the
term "judicial restraint" to denote a reluctance or refusal to strike down
statutes as unconstitutional. 33  I will use the term "judicial review" to
27 Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Deisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
723, 739 (1988).
28 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 15 (2001).
29 Id. at 15-16; see also BORE, supra note 18, at 155; Bret Boyce, Originalism and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909,940 (1998); Richard A. Primus, When Should
OriginalMeanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 177 (2OO8) ("Many doctrines that are central
to modern constitutional law are not reconcilable with original constitutional meanings.").
3o Balkin,supra note I8.
31 See Solum, supra note I8, at 138. While these conclusions might be welcomed by
liberals, Solum resists ideological classification. Id.
32 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986) (1962).
33 This is probably the most prominent meaning of "judicial restraint." See Frank B.
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denote a willingness to strike down statutes as unconstitutional, or to
denote the striking down of statutes.34 There is originalist judicial review
and nonoriginalist judicial review. Some arguments against originalism,
including arguments based on the original exclusions, are more powerful
against originalist judicial review than as arguments in favor of nonoriginalist
judicial review.
When conservatives embraced originalism to attack the liberal decisions
of the Warren and Burger Courts, originalism was strongly identified with
judicial restraint.35 After conservatives gained ascendancy on the Supreme
Court, however, the association between originalism and restraint became
attenuated.3 6 According to a study by Professor Lori Ringhand, Justices
Scalia and Thomas have voted to overturn federal statutes more often
than their liberal nonoriginalist colleagues. 37 The same study shows that
Justices Scalia and Thomas have voted to overturn state statutes less often
than their liberal nonoriginalist colleagues,38 but that may be because
preemption cases (involving judicial review under the Supremacy Clause)39
were not included in the study.'
This Article draws on concepts of constitutional legitimacy. Fallon has
usefully distinguished among moral legitimacy, sociological legitimacy, and
legal legitimacy.4I The moral legitimacy of a constitution refers to its "moral
justifiability or respect-worthiness. ' 4 The sociological legitimacy of a
constitution refers to its acceptance by citizens. 43 Thus, moral legitimacy
is a normative concept, while sociological legitimacy is a positive concept
(albeit with normative implications).' Originalists as well as nonoriginalists
Cross & Stefanie A. Lindquist, The Scientifc Study of Judicial Activism, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1752,
1759 (2007).
34 I use the term "judicial review" in place of "judicial activism" because the latter term
is too often used as a political epithet. See id. at 1756-58.
35 Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism ' Dead Hand-In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L.
REV. 1399, 1401, I4O6-o8 (2009).
36 Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the
Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 43,45-54,61 (2007).
37 Id. at 49. Cross and Lindquist obtain similar results using a more complicated mea-
sure. Cross & Lindquist, supra note 33, at 1775.
38 Ringhand, supra note 36, at 59-
39 U.S. CONsT. art. VI.
40 Ringhand, supra note 36, at 50.
41 Fallon, supra note 2.
42 Id. at 1796.
43 Id. at 1795-96. Legal legitimacy, in the case of a constitution, depends on sociological
legitimacy. Id. at I8o 5 ("With respect to the most fundamental matters, sociological legiti-
macy is not only a necessary condition of legal legitimacy, but also a sufficient one.").
44 See Legal Theory Lexicon: Legal Theory Lexicon 046: Legitimacy, http://Isolum.ty-
pepad.com/legal-theory-lexicon/2005/o6llegal-theory-le-2.html (Oct. 12, 2008). Solum uses
the terms "normative legitimacy" and "sociological legitimacy." Id.
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often assert that the source of the Constitution's moral legitimacy points
us to the proper method of interpreting the Constitution.45 A large part of
this Article is organized around the possible sources of the Constitution's
moral legitimacy, which I divide broadly into consent-based accounts and
result-based accounts. 6
What impact should the original exclusions have on constitutional
interpretation? They bear on constitutional interpretation in various
ways. Most straightforwardly, they undercut democratic-theoretical
justifications for originalism. In Part I of this Article, I consider whether
the mere ratification of provisions of the antebellum Constitution can
provide sufficient moral legitimacy to justify overriding laws passed by
contemporary, more fully democratic legislatures. If mere ratification gives
moral legitimacy, there is an argument for originalism based on democratic
theory and notions of popular sovereignty. Professor Keith Whittington has
offered such an argument,47 and Professor Bruce Ackerman, though not an
originalist, has made a compelling case for popular sovereignty that might
give comfort to originalists. 48 But the originalist argument from popular
sovereignty does not work because of the original exclusions.
In Part 11, 1 review result-based or consequentialist accounts of the moral
legitimacy of the Constitution. Some of these could support nonoriginalism,
while others could support originalism. I believe that the moral legitimacy
of the Constitution has been enhanced by nonoriginalist decisions and
nonoriginalist political behavior-in particular, by the elimination of original
exclusions. If the moral legitimacy of the Constitution derives in part from
past nonoriginalism, future nonoriginalism may need less justification.
One audacious result-based argument, from an originalist perspective,
is offered by Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport, who claim
45 See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 152; see also
Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, Io8 COLUM. L. REV.
6o6, 637-39 (2008). Professor Samaha is also skeptical of the connection. Id. at 61o-i I.
Originalists who rely on theories of meaning and interpretation often depart more ag-
gressively from the idea that the source of moral legitimacy points to the proper interpretive
method. As discussed below in Part VI, they claim that if we accept the Constitution as bind-
ing law, for whatever reason, originalism is the proper method of interpretation (or the only
method of interpretation).
Often scholars making the connection between moral legitimacy and proper interpreta-
tion use the term "authority" rather than "moral legitimacy." See id. at 637-39. I prefer the
term "moral legitimacy" because the term "authority" is ambiguous as between moral legiti-
macy and sociological legitimacy. To the extent that scholars believe that sociological legiti-
macy should guide interpretation irrespective of whether sociological legitimacy contributes
to moral legitimacy, they are advancing a different position than the one I discuss.
46 See infra Parts II and III.
47 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 17.
48 I ACKERMAN, supra note 1I; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note I I; Bruce Ackerman, The Living
Constitution, IZo HARv. L. REV. 1737,1800-02, 1809-12 (2007) [hereinafter Ackerman, The
Living Constitution].
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that originalism produces desirable results because the Constitution was
approved under a supermajority process.4 9 Their argument, however, fails
in light of the original exclusions and their attempts to save it are unavailing.
Indeed, the mirror image of the McGinnis-Rappaport position is more
credible: as the Constitution is so hard to amend, and as there has been
moral progress since the time of the antebellum Constitution, it makes
sense to assume that the original meaning of some remaining antebellum
provisions is morally retrograde and undesirable.
In Part III, I consider theories of moral legitimacy that rely on
contemporary consent. These approaches are more consistent with
nonoriginalist methods of interpretation than is the untenable popular-
sovereignty approach. However, some aspects of contemporary consent-
based legitimacy could give support to originalism.
In some cases, the text or original meaning of a constitutional provision
was plausibly affected by an original exclusion and in some cases, application
of a constitutional provision specially affects a previously-excluded class. If
one or both of these conditions apply, the case for nonoriginalism is arguably
stronger."0 I discuss such issues of exclusion-specific nonoriginalism in Part
IV. I also consider there the history of the requirement in Article V of the
Constitution that three-fourths of the states must ratify any amendment.51
This provision was inserted after the narrow defeat of a proposal to require
that only two-thirds of the states must ratify an amendment;"2 the defeat of
that proposal appears to reflect the interest of the deeper- South states in
protecting the slave trade.
3
In Part V, I offer my most radical arguments. First, the authority of
original meaning is fundamentally tainted insofar as that authority is said
to derive from any source in the antebellum period. Second, originalism
is objectionable as a method of constitutional interpretation because it
seeks to fix the meaning of antebellum provisions in the legal and political
culture that produced the original exclusions. These two antebellum-taint
arguments are particularly relevant to versions of originalism, discussed in
Part VI, that rely on theories of meaning and/or authority, and that profess
to be unconcerned with the source of the Constitution's moral legitimacy.
In the Conclusion, I review the various arguments I have offered by
considering how each fares under the minimalist conception of original
meaning that characterizes what I have called unexpected-applications
originalism. In general, arguments based on the original exclusions are
less powerful against unexpected-applications originalism than against
49 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note i i.
50 See Wright, supra note i i, at 697-98; Pollack, supra note I I, at 208.
51 U.S. CONST. art.V.
52 See FINKELMAN, supra note IO, at 33; 2 "IE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 558-59 (Max Farrand ed., 19 11).
53 See FINKELMAN, supra note io, at 33.
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expected-applications originalism. Indeed, many of these arguments could
be used by unexpected-applications originalists to support their view that
original meaning should not be considered to include original expected
application.
I. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
One normative basis for originalism is situated in democratic theory
and focuses on the justification for judicial review. According to some
originalists, it is only by relying on the authority of a previous, higher-law,
democratic process-the ratification of the Constitution or amendments-
that judges can justifiably override the will of contemporary democratic
majorities. And since the authority for imposing constitutional limits on
contemporary majorities comes from these past democratic processes,
the limits imposed should be those expressed at the time of ratification.
Professors Keith Whittington-' and Robert Bork 5 among others, have
argued along these lines. Professor Bruce Ackerman, while not precisely
an originalist, has offered a similar argument.
6
For an originalism based in democratic theory, the original exclusions
are uncomfortable facts. The processes that generated the Constitution
seem obviously inferior and less democratic than the processes that
generate contemporary federal statutes. True, the original Constitution
was ratified by a supermajority of representatives elected by propertied
white men, but that is a supermajority of a small minority. Surely, the will
of a simple majority, in a free society with universal suffrage, should have
greater democratic legitimacy than the will of the privileged few in a slave
society with very limited suffrage.
The taint of slavery actually undercuts the democratic legitimacy of
the Constitution in at least two ways. Slavery was a feature of the political
processes that produced the Constitution, and the Constitution itself
accommodated and protected slavery. Put another way, slavery tainted
both the adoption process and the substantive provisions of antebellum
constitutionalism.
54 See WHIrrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 35-37, 78-79,
140-41.
55 BORK, supra note I8, at 143.
56 Set, e.g., I ACKERMAN, supra note I I, at 316-18. As Professor Michael Doff explains,
Ackerman accepts important assumptions of originalism, but Ackerman avoids originalism
through a number of moves, the most important of which is his argument that the Constitution
can be amended, and has been amended, outside the Article V process. See Michael C. Doff,
Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEo.
L.J. 1765, 1774-81 (1997).
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A. Preliminary Distinctions
It is important, at this preliminary stage, to distinguish the argument
based on original exclusions, offered here, from the "presentist" or "dead
hand" argument that maintains that present people should not be bound
by the decisions of people long dead. 7 Some, unfortunately, do not
recognize this distinction. Judge Michael McConnell, for example, writes
that "the oft-heard complaint that the Constitution has no legitimate
claim of authority to bind us because blacks and women were excluded
from the franchise in 1787, seems beside the point. No one now alive was
represented in 1787." 58
But regardless of one's view of the presentist argument against
originalism or constitutionalism, the argument from original exclusions
has independent force. Suppose we believe that it is sometimes morally
legitimate for the decisions of contemporary people to be constrained
by the decisions of people long dead. We can and should still say that
the processes that generated constraining law cannot provide it moral
legitimacy if they are far less democratic than contemporary processes, and
if they also produced a Constitution that accommodated slavery.
McConnell's argument that the original exclusions are "beside the
point" 9 would have some plausibility if it were offered by an opponent
of originalism. An opponent of originalism could say that the lack of
representation of contemporary people is enough to rule out originalism,
regardless of who was represented at the Founding. But a friend of
originalism, such as McConnell, needs to overcome both the presentist
objection and the argument based on original exclusions.
Originalists also sometimes fail to distinguish between the moral
legitimacy of the antebellum Constitution and the moral legitimacy that
the Constitution of today can claim. McConnell writes: "Americans whose
predecessors were excluded from voting on the original Constitution-such
as women and African-Americans-apparently venerate the Constitution
no less ardently than propertied white males.... [B]lacks and women today
are no more inclined than any other portions of the population to jettison
the Constitution." 60 The suggestion here is that defects in the antebellum
Constitution bear only on whether the Constitution should today be
considered legitimate; they do not bear on the merits of originalism. In fact,
the opposite is more nearly true. Elected representatives in America are no
57 Compare WHI'TTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, Supra note 17, at 196, with
Michael S. Moore, Interpretation Symposium: Philosophy of Language and Legal Interpretation: A
Natural Law Theory ofInterpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 279 (1985).
58 McConnell,supra note ii, at I 132. When this article was publishedJudge McConnell
was Professor McConnell.
59 Id.
6o Id. at 1132-33.
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longer selected by propertied white males; the Constitution today prohibits
federal and state governments from denying the right to vote on the basis of
race or gender.61 Further, the Constitution today no longer accommodates
slavery; it prohibits slavery.62 These defects of the antebellum Constitution
have been remedied (by the Civil War, various constitutional amendments,
state-law expansion of the franchise, and Supreme Court decisions), 63 so
they do not suggest that the current Constitution is morally illegitimate.
But the remediation of the Constitution does not establish that the mere
ratification of provisions of the antebellum Constitution justifies overriding
the democratically-passed laws of today. On the contrary: our awareness
that the Constitution has gained greater legitimacy by eliminating original
exclusions reinforces the conclusion that original ratification cannot
alone provide moral legitimacy. As Justice Thurgood Marshall put it,
"'We the People' no longer enslave, but the credit does not belong to the
framers." 4
Though I deny that the mere ratification of the antebellum Constitution
supplies the Constitution of today with enough moral legitimacy to
override a contemporary statute,65 I do not deny that the Constitution of
today has enough moral legitimacy to override a contemporary statute. The
Constitution's moral legitimacy derives from other sources, as discussed in
Parts II and III below.
The conclusions I urge in this Part are based on contestable judgments
and intuitions concerning democratic legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy,
as the concept is usually understood, is a kind of moral or normative
legitimacy (though it is not the whole of moral legitimacy). The criteria for
democratic legitimacy are not agreed upon. Suppose it were accepted that
a political process in which the great majority of adults are eligible to vote
has greater legitimacy than a political process in which a small minority of
adults are eligible to vote, and suppose further it were accepted that the
political processes of a free society have greater legitimacy than the political
processes of a slave society. Under these criteria, an originalism based in
democratic theory would be ridiculous. Obviously, however, originalists
who rely on democratic theory do not accept, or do not fully accept, these
criteria of democratic legitimacy.
61 U.S. CONST. amend. XV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
62 U.S. CONST. amend. XllI.
63 See infra notes 128-3 1, 139-50 and accompanying text.
64 Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, i o i
HAv. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987).
65 I use the somewhat inexact phrase "mere ratification" as shorthand for mere produc-
tion, which includes all the processes that lead to the adoption of a constitutional provision.
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B. The Concept of Popular Sovereignty
How, then, could it be thought that the mere ratification of the original
Constitution provides sufficient moral legitimacy to override a contemporary
statute? The idea here is that of "popular sovereignty." The Constitution, it
is said, was the work of the People, while contemporary statutes are merely
the work of the People's representatives. As the work of the People takes
precedence over the work of the representatives of the People, the mere
ratification of the Constitution does provide moral legitimacy to override a
contemporary statute and, moreover, we must interpret the Constitution as
it was interpreted by the People at the time of adoption.
The two leading contemporary exponents of popular sovereignty, with
respect to American constitutionalism, are Ackerman and Whittington. As
noted, Ackerman is not actually an originalist; his chief departure from
originalism is his insistence that the Constitution can be amended, and
has been amended, outside the Article V process.66 However, Ackerman
accepts important assumptions of originalism, 67 and his eloquent exposition
of the concept of popular sovereignty can be relied on by originalists of
a more traditional bent. Whittington, in his own treatment of popular
sovereignty, acknowledges some debt to Ackerman.' Of course, the idea
of popular sovereignty as connected with judicial review goes far back in
American constitutionalism-Chief Justice John Marshall expressed it in
Marbury v. Madison,69 as did Alexander Hamilton, even more energetically,
in Federalist No. 78.70
Ackerman describes the American constitutional system as one of
"dualist democracy, ' 71 in which there is a sharp distinction between higher
lawmaking, accomplished by the People, and ordinary lawmaking. He
writes that "our normally elected representatives are only 'stand-ins' for the
People and should not be generally allowed to suppose that they speak for
the People themselves .... ,,7 The Supreme Court, he believes, is and should
be "an ongoing representative of a mobilized People during the lengthy
periods of apathy, ignorance, and selfishness that mark the collective life of
66 See I ACKERMAN, supra note I", 316-19; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note I 1, 88-91; Ackerman,
The Living Constitution, supra note 48.
67 See Dorf, supra note 56, at 1774-81. In Doff's terminology, Ackerman is not a "strict
originalist." Id.
68 WHIITINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 270 n.59 ("As will
become evident, there are similarities between my arguments in this chapter and those of
Bruce Ackerman.").
69 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 173-79 (1803).
70 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
71 i ACKERMAN, supra note I I, at 6.
72 Id. at 236.
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the private citizenry of a liberal republic."' 3
Whittington embraces the concept of "dualism,"7 4 and similarly elevates
the authority of the People, as opposed to the authority of government:
Originalism insists that government has no intrinsic authority; other
approaches position government officials as autonomous political actors.
By depending on the authority of the constitutional conventions to
define constitutional meaning, originalism indicates and draws upon the
constitutional foundation of popular sovereignty-that the people alone
determine the higher law."5
There is a certain mystical quality to such claims, which may be more
attractive to some than to others. I confess that I do find the romantic
idealization of popular sovereignty, in authors such as Ackerman and
Whittington, to be surprisingly inspiring.16 But a dualism between higher,
popular constitutionalism and lower, representative government still does
not require us to say that the mere ratification of the antebellum Constitution
imbues it with sufficient moral legitimacy to override contemporary laws.
Once again, the distinction between the presentist argument and the
argument over original exclusions is crucial. We might accept a mystical
view of the People speaking in a higher voice, through constitutional
enactments, so as to bind representative government centuries in the
future. But we can also, simultaneously, deny that the purported work
of the People has the moral legitimacy to bind subsequent generations,
merely from the processes that produced it, if it is not the work of the
People at all, but only the product of a small privileged minority.
C. In Search of People-ness
What is it about the creation of the original Constitution that suggests it
was produced by "the People?" And do contemporary federal statutes have
these same features to an equal or greater extent? I will review the various
reasons to believe that the antebellum Constitution was produced by the
People, mentioning the relevant positions of Ackerman and Whittington.
After surveying these possible aspects of People-ness, I will conclude that
73 Id. at z65.
74 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 135, 137.
75 Id. at i55. Whittington also states that "'the people,' in their sovereign capacity, do
not always exist.... Rather, the people emerge at particular historical moments to deliberate
on constitutional issues and to provide binding expressions of their will, which are to serve
as fundamental law in the future when the sovereign is absent. Between these moments,
the only available expression of the sovereign will is the constitutional text, and government
agents are bound by the limits of that text." Id. at 135.
76 1 find it even more inspiring in Ackerman than in Whittington, perhaps because
Ackerman is not actually an originalist.
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if "the People" is a moralized concept, the antebellum Constitution should
be considered less the product of the People than a contemporary federal
statute. If "the People" is a stipulated concept, then of course it is possible
to say that the antebellum Constitution was produced by the People. In
that event, however, we should still conclude that the mere ratification
of the antebellum Constitution provides it with insufficient democratic
legitimacy and (most fundamentally) insufficient moral legitimacy to
override a contemporary statute.
Ackerman capitalizes "the People," while Whittington does not. I will
follow Ackerman's usage, as it better represents the concept sought to be
conveyed.
1. Direct Consent.- In countries other than the United States, constitutions
are often ratified by plebiscite or referendum. It certainly can be claimed
that a constitution approved by referendum has been approved by the
People, rather than merely by the People's representatives. However,
none of the provisions in the United States Constitution were approved
by referendum. The production of the Constitution, like the production
of contemporary laws, was a representative process. White males (those
who were able to satisfy the applicable property requirements or pay the
applicable poll taxes) voted for elected representatives to the ratifying
conventions, and those representatives, not the people themselves, voted
to ratify the Constitution." If there is a plebiscitary element to People-
ness, the Constitution does not possess that element.7"
Whittington argues that it actually adds to the legitimacy of the
Constitution that the pro-Constitution federalists won perhaps a minority
of popular votes and were able to secure ratification only by convincing
delegates to vote unrepresentatively. 9 Whatever the merit of this argument,
it does not reflect a plebiscitary view of democratic legitimacy. Ackerman
is more favorable to the plebiscitary approach. He argues that watershed
elections during Reconstruction and the New Deal should, in effect, be
considered constitutional plebiscites, and he supports introducing a formal
77 U.S. CONST. art. VII.
78 The ratification of the original Constitution might still be thought more direct, more
similar to a plebiscite, than the passage of a contemporary statute or than the ratification of
constitutional amendments by state legislatures, as the only issue in the convention elections
of 1787-88 was ratification of the Constitution.
79 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 148 ("The ini-
tial election of delegates to the ratification conventions favored the opponents of the
Constitution. An immediate majority vote based simply on the strength of numbers would
have found the Federalists in the minority. In order to win ratification, proponents of the
Constitution necessarily had to 'convert' some of their opponents. In allowing such delibera-
tion, the anti-Federalists threw the outcome of the conventions into doubt and eventually lost
control over the results. In doing so, however, they enhanced the authority of the adopted
Constitution.").
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plebiscitary element into the American constitutional process.80  Yet
Ackerman does not claim that any part of the antebellum Constitution was
approved directly by the People.81
2. Mobilized Deliberation.- Key to Ackerman's conception of the People is
the idea of "mobilized deliberation."" Ackerman complains that normal
politics is beset by "apathy, ignorance, and selfishness."83 By contrast, he
suggests, constitutional politics is characterized, to a much greater degree,
by engagement, knowledge, and the citizen's motivation to choose between
alternatives based on "the rights of citizens and the permanent interests of
the community."'  In a similar vein, Whittington claims that factions and
party politics are "inconsistent with constitutional deliberation." 5
This is, of course, a highly idealized vision of constitutional politics. As
Ackerman recognizes, this idealized vision corresponds far more closely to
other periods of American constitutional politics than to the Founding.86
The Constitution was the product of bargaining between interests groups
or factions, including the slavery faction (comprising the five Southern
states) and the slave-trading faction (comprising the three deeper-South
states).87
One structural feature of American constitutional politics that does
correspond to the value of mobilized deliberation is our two-stage process
of enactment. Constitutional provisions are first approved by elected
representatives (or, in the case of the original Constitution, delegates
selected by elected representatives). 8  Then the constitutional proposals
are submitted for ratification to a second set of representatives.8 9 This two-
stage process may be conducive to greater deliberation.
3. Supermajority.- Another structural feature of our process, of course, is
the supermajoriry requirements in Article V and Article VII. Whittington
appears to attach considerable significance to supermajority requirements,
stating that "[o]riginalism provides that current majorities can only be
8o I ACKERMAN, supra note I I, at 54-55. He opposes, however, quickie ratifications that
occur in other countries. Id.
81 See id.
8z Id. at 285.
83 Id. at 235.
84 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. io (James Madison)). Ackerman notes that this is a
slightly modified quotation from Federalist No. io. Id. at 352 n.4; see also id. at 240.
85 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 147.
86 z ACKERMAN, supra note I i, at 87-91.
87 See FINKELMAN, supra note io, at 3-36; see also DAVID BRIAN ROBERTSON, THE
CONSTITUTION AND AMERICA'S DESTINY 18o-81 (2005).
88 U.S. CONST. arts. V, VII.
89 Id.
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restricted by the demonstrable intentions of prior supermajorities." 9
Ackerman places less emphasis on supermajority requirements, consistent
with his view that the Constitution can be amended through plebiscitary
processes that do not meet those formal requirements.9 In any event, we
now know that what may have seemed a supermajority in 1788 was in fact
a "sub-minority."9 Far fewer people, as a percentage of the population,
were entitled to participate in voting for representatives who ratified the
Constitution than are entitled to participate in voting for representatives
who pass a contemporary federal statute (and of course, the difference in
the absolute number of people entitled to participate in voting now and at
the Founding is even more enormous).
4. Common Thread: Representativeness.- The criteria of People-ness thus
far discussed-the directness of voting, the political engagement of the
population, the two-stage process, the supermajority requirements-all
concern the representativeness of the enactment: is it representative of the
popular will? While the antebellum Constitution and its amendments may
score higher on some of these measures than a contemporary federal statute,
they must score lower as to the ultimate standard of representativeness.
The unrepresentativeness of the antebellum franchise-the exclusion of
the great majority of people from voting-must surely wash away any other
indicia of representativeness. Even if the antebellum Constitution had
scored higher on some relevant criteria-even if, for example, it had been
approved by a referendum, with an overwhelming percentage of propertied
white male voters participating-it would still have a relatively poor claim
to be the work of the People. The most trivial and obscure contemporary
federal statute is much more the work of the People of the United States
than was the antebellum Constitution.
5. Slavery as Negating the Existence of the People.- The discussion thus far has
not even taken into account that the society that produced the antebellum
Constitution was a slave society. The existence of slavery, in and of itself,
should negate any claim of popular sovereignty at the Founding. The
mythical concept of popular sovereignty requires a single sovereign will.
But if the population includes both a master class and a slave class, they
cannot be said to be part of the same political body, with a single collective
will. Whittington comes very close to recognizing this problem in his
90 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 203.
91 I ACKERMAN, supra note I I, at 265 ("mobilizing a majority"), 286 ("mobilized major-
ity").
92 To elucidate the term "subminority," first deprive at least one-half of the population
of suffrage (women). That produces a minority rule. Then, deprive other groups of suffrage
seriatim (African American slaves, poor men, Native Americans who might have voted) and the
ruling minority becomes smaller and smaller.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
general discussion of the sovereign will. He writes:
As Rousseau noted, the general law is expressed through majority voting,
but the minority authors that law by accepting it as their own .... The
continued rejection of the general law by the minority indicates that there
is in fact no common society between the majority and minority; they do not
form a single people and therefore possess no common sovereign. 93
Whittington fails, however, to draw the appropriate conclusion: in a slave
society, there is no People.
6. The People as Defined by the Franchise?- It is, of course, possible to
adopt a stipulated, non-moralized account of People-ness, according to
which the Constitution was the work of the People, while a contemporary
federal statute is not the work of the People. We could say that whenever
a constitution becomes effective, whoever was entitled to vote on its
ratification ipsofacto comprised the People. If the original Constitution had
been ratified by the governors of the thirteen states, we could say, it would
still have been the work of the People.
While he elsewhere advocates a somewhat idealized conception of
popular sovereignty, Whittington at one point comes close to this stipulated
account of the People as being defined by the franchise. He takes the
position that women, African-American slaves, and disenfranchised poor
whites were not initially part of the People.94 Whittington states that "[t]he
people did not exist until they constituted themselves through the action
of forming a constitution.... Similarly, since the founding, the people have
modified themselves, expanding the rights of full citizenship to include
blacks, women, the poor, and young adults." 9s
Although the idea of the People as being defined by the franchise is not
restricted to originalists, 9 such an idea is fundamentally inconsistent with
any theory of popular sovereignty. The mystical concept of "the People,"
in a theory of popular sovereignty, claims a normative force beyond that of
political success; a stipulated definition based purely on political success
does not fit that concept. We should not say that thirteen governors, if they
93 WHIITINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 146.
94 Id. at 145.
95 Id.
96 See, e.g., Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 531 (1996) ("Through a century plus three decades and more of [United States] history,
women did not count among voters composing 'We the People'; not until 192o did women
gain a constitutional right to the franchise."); Marshall, supra note 64, at 5 ("'We the People'
no longer enslave, but the credit does not belong to the framers.").
These references to "the People" by Justices Ginsburg and Marshall may be somewhat
ironic. They may not represent a considered view that the People is a relevant concept in
normative democratic theory and that the People is defined by the franchise.
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are able to establish an effective constitution, are the People. If we do, we
are really talking about sociological legitimacy and/or acceptance over time,
as discussed below,97 not popular sovereignty.
In any event, with a stipulated definition of the People as defined by
the franchise, there can be no serious claim to democratic legitimacy. If the
People exclude the vast majority of the population, the work of the People
is due no respect as a matter of democratic theory. Thus, arguments that
the Constitution was produced by the People either boil down to claims
about representativeness, in which case they are false, or they involve a
stipulated definition of the People that is not worthy of respect.
D. Objections and Qualifications
It may be wondered whether my discussion of the moral legitimacy of
the antebellum Constitution is inappropriately anachronistic. Is it fair to
criticize the Constitution of 200 years ago by the standards of today? As
Professor Akhil Amar and other admirers of the 1787 Constitution have
stressed, it was ratified under processes that were democratic for their time
(at least if one ignores the effect on democratic legitimacy of the institution
of slavery, which was controversial even then).98 Maybe we should take a
relativistic approach, saying that the antebellum Constitution was the work
of the People, judged by the standards of the time.
In response, originalist judicial review presents a cross-temporal conflict:
the antebellum Constitution of the past versus the more democratically-
legitimate law of today. Assessing this cross-temporal conflict is not a
matter of deciding which moral standards to apply to conflicts in the past.
Originalists (at least those who rely on democratic theory) do not merely claim
that ratification of the antebellum Constitution provided moral legitimacy
to override laws of antebellum America; they claim that ratification of the
antebellum Constitution provides moral legitimacy to override laws of
today. Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to evaluate the claimed
moral legitimacy of original ratification by the standards of a free society
with universal suffrage."
Separate objections could be raised as to the significance of slavery in this
discussion. I have argued that the democratic legitimacy of the antebellum
Constitution was doubly undermined by slavery: the Constitution was
produced by a slave society, and the Constitution protected slavery.
Some might disagree; they might believe that slavery in no way affects
the democratic legitimacy of the antebellum Constitution. As to the
constitutional provisions accommodating slavery, they might argue that
97 See infra Part III.
98 AmAR, supra note 5, at I8.
99 Simon, supra note 3, at 1498 n.44.
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democratic legitimacy is determined only by process, not by substance. As
to the production of the Constitution in a slave society, they might argue
that the only democratic defect was the denial of voting rights to slaves.
The Constitution would have had no greater democratic legitimacy, they
might say, if there had been a denial of voting rights to the same individuals,
but without slavery.
These hypothetical arguments, which might or might not be congenial
to defenders of the antebellum Constitution, demonstrate the observation
I made early in this Part that democratic legitimacy is a normative and
contested concept that is not the whole of moral legitimacy. We should
reject a concept of democratic legitimacy under which slavery is irrelevant.
But even if we were to entertain such a concept of democratic legitimacy,
it would be impossible to ignore slavery when we consider the ultimate
standard of moral legitimacy.
Another objection that could be raised concerning slavery involves
counterfactual reasoning. It could be argued that the founding generation
acted out of necessity in accommodating slavery. If we say that the slavery-
accommodating provisions of the antebellum Constitution taint the
constitutional processes of the time, we implicitly take the position that
the Northern states should not have agreed to those provisions. Would not
the result have been a separate slave confederacy, precisely the result that
the Civil War was fought to prevent?1°°
In response, there is no reason our evaluation of moral legitimacy need
hold constant the motivations of the Southern states, and ask only what
the opponents of slavery could have done to combat it. We can have a
moral evaluation of the system as a whole, and that evaluation must be
negative. 01
I pause here for some clarifications. Thus far, the argument does not
claim to show that originalism fails; it claims merely that one justification
for originalism fails, that the ratification of the antebellum Constitution
does not provide moral legitimacy for originalist judicial review. Also, the
argument does not, thus far, establish any ground for nonoriginalist judicial
review. Discrediting ratification of the antebellum Constitution as a ground
for originalist judicial review may be a step toward justifying nonoriginalist
judicial review. With this step taken, the nonoriginalist can argue that the
moral legitimacy of the Constitution resides elsewhere than in original
ioo SeeMcGinnis & Rappaport,supra note i i, at 395 (presenting a view along these lines
as to the slavery issue).
ioi There is also debate among historians as to whether the Southern states or states of
the "Deep South" would have refused to accept the Constitution without various slavery-ac-
commodating provisions. See FINKELMAN, supra note 1O, at 31-32. Assuming there had been a
separate slave Confederacy, the absence of a fugitive slave clause might have weakened it and
hastened the demise of slavery. Some would emphatically consider the accommodation of
slavery to be wrong even if non-accommodation had results that were even worse. But these
are, in my view, only subsidiary arguments.
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ratification, in some source that supports nonoriginalist judicial review. On
the other hand, it may be that if originalist judicial review is not justified,
no judicial review is justified. 0
E. Post-Exclusion Popular Sovereignty
The provisions of our Constitution were produced at different times,
and they differ in the extent to which the mere processes by which
they were created provide sufficient moral legitimacy to override a
contemporary law. The originalist argument based in democratic theory
becomes progressively stronger with provisions added after the abolition
of slavery,103 the Nineteenth Amendment,' °4 the end of Jim Crow,05 and
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment. 1' 6 With the elimination of each original
exclusion, the argument that mere ratification provides moral legitimacy
becomes stronger. The contemporary American political system is subject
to some democratic-theoretical objections, but obviously it is far superior
to the antebellum system. A popular sovereignty argument can be made for
originah!ist interpretation of recent and future constitutional amendments,
and such an argument would not be refuted by the original exclusions.
A separate question is how amendments ratified under universal suffrage
bearon the interpretation ofconstitutional provisions thatwere ratified under
the exclusion-tainted processes. Suppose each constitutional amendment
in American history was accompanied by the following reauthorization
clause: "Aside from the changes made in this amendment, all provisions
of this Constitution are hereby reauthorized, according to their original
meanings." Such reauthorization clauses would certainly rehabilitate
the popular-sovereignty justification for originalism. However, no such
originalist reauthorization clauses actually appear in the Constitution; nor are
they implicit. The ratification of an amendment means that its supporters
102 I cannot address here, but should briefly mention, the argument made by a num-
ber of originalists that some instances of originalist judicial review, involving federalism, do
not implicate the countermajoritarian difficulty because they merely determine which demo-
cratic government has responsibility for an area of regulation. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi,
Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1373, 1385-94 (1998).
I believe that the national self-identity of Americans supports federal responsibility beyond
what most originalists would allow, and that many originalist federalism decisions do, there-
fore, contravene democracy.
lo3 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
104 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (extending franchise to women).
IO5 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964), Civil Rights
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2oooa etseq & 18
U.S.C. § 245 (zooo)) (in effect overruling Jim Crow laws); Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-1 10, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-i
(2000)) (same).
lO6 U.S. CONsT. amend. XXVI, § i (extending franchise to those eighteen and older).
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have achieved the high level of consensus necessary to change some part
of the Constitution, 107 but the ratification of an amendment does not mean
that the high level of consensus, necessary for ratification, actually exists to
retain the other provisions of the Constitution. 10  Some inferences about
the sociological legitimacy of the Constitution might be drawn from the use
of the amendment process, 1' 9 but sociological legitimacy, discussed in Part
III, is not popular sovereignty. And in any event, even if the ratification
of an amendment did implicitly reauthorize existing provisions, it would
not necessarily authorize the originalist interpretation of those provisions.
More plausibly, a reauthorization of existing provisions would license
whatever methods of interpretation reigned at the time of later ratification.
The most recent amendments, of course, were passed during what is often
considered a nonoriginalist period.
1. Whitington's Reciprocal Originalism.-As an adjunct to his argument that
popular sovereignty provides moral legitimacy, Whittington argues that the
contemporary generation, which can claim democratic legitimacy for any
possible amendments, should recognize a "reciprocating relationship" with
the founders. 10 He writes:
[O]riginalism secures the effectiveness of a future expression of the
popular will. By maintaining the principle that constitutional meaning
is determined by its authors, originalism provides the basis for future
constitutional deliberations by the people. Present and future generations
can only expect their own constitutional will to be effectuated if they are
willing to give effect to prior such expressions.... Unless we accept the
authority of the past, we cannot assert our own authority over the future,
whether understood as a matter of decades or as a matter of weeks." 1
It is not completely clear, in the passage above, whether Whittington
is making a point about moral consistency, an actual prediction about the
production of constitutional amendments in a nonoriginalist system, or
both. Berman interprets Whittington as making an actual prediction."'
I interpret Whittington as conveying both meanings, but I focus on the
107 See U.S. CONST. art. V.
io8 Id.
1o9 For example, the ratification of an amendment shows that amendment is possible,
which means that a failure to amend other provisions demonstrates a weak kind of sociologi-
cal legitimacy.
I I o WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 133.
11I Id. at 156. This reciprocity argument is really a separate argument, different from the
argument that mere ratification provides moral legitimacy. I note it here because it is integral
to Whittington's theory.
112 Berman, supra note i 2, at 74-75.
[Vol. 98
2009-2010] ORIGINALISM AND ORIGINAL EXCLUSIONS 419
argument from moral consistency.
113
Suppose we held ourselves morally bound to deal with the formal
constitutional product of prior generations (the Constitution and past
amendments) as we would have future generations deal with our own
formal constitutional product. An originalist such as Whittington could
then argue that since we want to preserve the original meaning of any
contemporary amendments, we must likewise abide by the original
meaning of the Constitution and past amendments. An initial problem
with this argument, of course, is that not everyone in the current generation
shares the objective of preserving the original meaning of constitutional
amendments. I certainly do not share that objective. I would like the
meaning of any contemporary amendments to be capable of drift over time,
in a manner similar to the way the meaning of past enactments has drifted
over time.
114
Nevertheless, suppose that the current generation did want to prevent
any future drift in the meaning of contemporary amendments. Or, more
realistically, suppose we wanted to assure that the meaning of contemporary
amendments would never drift as much as has the meaning of some past
constitutional enactments. We could still justify a nonoriginalist reading
of past enactments, at least of the antebellum Constitution. Our maxim,
to speak in Kantian terms,11 would be "preserve the original meaning
of constitutional amendments enacted under democratically legitimate
procedures." This maxim might commit us to originalism in interpreting
all amendments subsequent to the Nineteenth Amendment, or all those
subsequent to the Civil Rights movement. It would not, however, commit
us to originalism in interpreting the original Constitution or the Bill of
Rights.
2. Ackerman on the Original Exclusions.- Whittington does not seriously
confront the original exclusions. Ackerman does seriously confront them, in
both volumes of We the People, and reaches somewhat different conclusions
in each volume. 116 In the first volume, Foundations, Ackerman considers
the original exclusions to be troubling, but decides that they should not
shake our commitment to dualism and popular sovereignty."7 In the
second volume, Transformations, Ackerman revisits the original exclusions
and makes them a part of his argument for the recognition of informal
113 See id. (discussing Whittington's reciprocity argument as an actual prediction).
114 Some of the reasons for this view are given in Parts II and III of this Article.
115 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MoRALs 88 (H. J. Paton trans.,
Hutchinson & Co. 1964) (1785) ("Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same
time will that it should become a universal law.").
116 See I ACKERMAN, supra note t I, at 3 14-19; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note i i, at 87-9 1.
117 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 1 I, at 314-19.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
constitutional amendment."" Ackerman argues, in this second volume
of We the People, that the original exclusions, along with other defects of
popular sovereignty at the Founding, should help to convince us that later
exercises of popular sovereignty suffice to amend the Constitution, even if
those later exercises of popular sovereignty do not satisfy the requirements
of Article V."9 He writes:
I hardly wish to deny that the Federalists fell far short of the ideal of popular
sovereignty, even as it was understood in the eighteenth century. When
judged in modern terms, the Founding looks even worse.
... Perhaps you might be justified in granting Article Five a monopoly
on constitutional change if the Founding had approximated the ideal of
popular sovereignty more closely than any later constitutional transformation
in American history. But the facts refute such a supposition.... Given these
Founding deficits, it seems morally bizarre, as well as legally inappropriate,
to grant the Federalists the constitutional authority to lay down the rules for
subsequent efforts to speak in the name of the People. 20
I do not here join the debate over Ackerman's theories, but he might
be well advised, for his own purposes, to take a further step in addressing
the significance of the original exclusions. Instead of claiming that defects
of popular sovereignty at the Founding allow us to give equal status to
later exercises of popular sovereignty, perhaps he should claim that the
only real exercises of popular sovereignty came later. By taking the mantle
of popular sovereignty away from the Founding, Ackerman would be
better positioned to argue that the Reconstruction Amendments should
be interpreted broadly, and that the New Deal was a "constitutional
moment."
II. RESULT-BASED MORAL LEGITIMACY
The popular-sovereignty strategy for dissolving the countermajoritarian
difficulty is to say that judicial review upholds the product of a higher and
truer democratic process, albeit one removed in time. As discussed in
Part I, such an argument cannot be convincing in the face of the original
exclusions, at least as to provisions that originated in the antebellum
Constitution. First, the antebellum Constitution was less the product of "the
People" than is a contemporary statute. Second, and more fundamentally,
the antebellum Constitution derives less democratic legitimacy from the
i18 2 ACKERMAN, supra note I i, at 87-91.
i19 Id.
120 Id. at 87-88.
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ratification process than a contemporary statute derives from its manner
of production. Third, and most fundamentally, the mere ratification of the
antebellum Constitution provides less moral legitimacy than the production
of a contemporary statute.
In Part III below, I discuss the alternative strategy of justifying judicial
review by reliance on some form of contemporary consent. Here, I consider
result-based moral legitimacy. Many believe that moral legitimacy can
reside in result-based or consequentialist considerations in addition to (or
instead of) consent-based considerations. Under a result-based approach,
law is morally legitimate if it produces good results. The results on which
moral legitimacy is based may involve the content of law, the predictability
of law, or other matters.
For purposes of this discussion, I class as "consequentialist" even views
that are considered non-consequentialist in contemporary moral philosophy.
For example, there are libertarians who believe that rights are absolute
constraints, never to be violated even if failure to violate them will result
in more rights-violations. II This is considered a non-consequentialist
position. But if a libertarian argued for the moral legitimacy of a law on
the ground that it embodied the libertarian conception of rights as absolute
constraints, ZI I would consider that a consequentialist, result-based
conception of the moral legitimacy of law.
The idea of result-based moral legitimacy is of course troubling to those
who have any formalist impulse, 2 3 which is probably most of us. On the
other hand, most of us probably accept result-based moral legitimacy to
some extent. An obvious example is Brown v. Board of Education.114 While
initially controversial, Brown is now almost universally accepted. Moreover,
it is held up as a test of interpretive method. Rather than questioning
whether Brown was correctly decided, we take it as given that the result
is correct and measure the legitimacy of interpretive methods, such as
originalism, by whether they can support Brown."2 5
I have already discussed a reverse example, of result-based illegitimacy,
at length in Part I: the illegitimacy of the slavery-accommodating provisions
of the antebellum Constitution.2 6  Regardless of the processes that
produced the slavery-accommodating provisions, we do not consider them
121 Perhaps it would be most accurate to say "hardly ever" rather than "never." Even
Nozick, in his most libertarian period, entertained the idea that rights can be violated to avert
a large amount of suffering. See ROBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 41 (1974).
122 Of major constitutional theorists, Barnett is closest to this position. See BARNETT,
supra note 2 1, at 48-52.
123 Fallon, supra note 2, at 1834-36.
124 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
125 See supra note 26 (debate over originalism and Brown).
126 As I have noted, some might deny that substance bears on democratic legitimacy; but
it surely bears on moral legitimacy.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
morally legitimate, and some of us (including some originalists), believe
that they tainted the moral legitimacy of the antebellum Constitution as a
whole." 7
The Reconstruction Amendments provide another important example
of result-based legitimacy.' As detailed by Ackerman, the Thirteenth
Amendment has a questionable originalist pedigree, and the Fourteenth
Amendment has an even shakier claim, on originalist grounds, to be part of
the Constitution."2 9 President Andrew Johnson obtained ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment through military pressure, and the Reconstruction
Congress refused to seat representatives from the Southern states until
they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.130 Professor Kent Greenawalt
has speculated that given "the especially troublesome aspect of federal
coercion of state approval" of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
"it is possible that the Supreme Court would review the validity of a modern
amendment ratified in circumstances similar to those surrounding the two
amendments."' 3
Ackerman believes that the Reconstruction Amendments exemplify
consent-based legitimacy in the form of unconventional popular
sovereignty.13  His arguments are powerful. But consider what might be
our attitude to the Fourteenth Amendment if, instead of protecting civil
rights, it enacted some narrow rule of sectional advantage. Suppose that
the Fourteenth Amendment enacted a rule on tariffs that benefited the
industrial North at the expense of the agricultural South. 33 We might then
take more seriously the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment is not
a valid part of the Constitution. The moral legitimacy of the Fourteenth
Amendment, I believe, derives in large part from its good content.
Fallon endorses some degree of result-based moral legitimacy,
though he also considers it "a controversial and even dangerous form of
127 Solum, supra note 18, at 9 n.27.
128 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV.
129 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 1 I, at 99-252.
130 Id. at 99-ioI; see also Kent Greenawalt, The Ruk of Recognition and the Constitution, 85
MICH. L. REV. 62 I, 640 (1987) (noting that "serious questions can be raised about the original
validity of the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments") (relying on Ackerman's analysis); Bret
Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 934-35 (1998)
(same).
In contrast to Ackerman, Amar argues that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
were ratified in accordance with Article V. AmAR, supra note 5, at 364-80. However, Amar's
argument is almost explicitly nonoriginalist. He relies on a "dynamic" interpretation of the
Republican Guarantee Clause in Article IV, Section 4, even though he notes that "certain pas-
sages from The Federalist seemed to lean toward a static test." Id. at 371. See Ackerman, The
Living Constitution, supra note 48, at 1747 n.25 (Ackerman responding to Amar).
13i Greenawalt, supra note 13o, at 641.
132 2 ACKERMAN, supra note I I, at 99-252.
133 Having congratulated myself on thinking up this example, I see that Amar thought
of it first. See AMAI, supra note 5, at 377.
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argument." 134 As an example of result-based moral legitimacy, Fallon
discusses Boiling v. Sharpe,'3s in which the Supreme Court held that racial
segregation in the District of Columbia schools was a violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, thereby effecting a reverse
incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
into the Fifth Amendment. Fallon and others consider Boiling harder to
justify on originalist grounds than Brown itself.13 6 Nevertheless, Fallon
states:
I would say that the Supreme Court acted morally legitimately in deciding
Boiling v. Sharpe as it did, even if the Court's constitutional holding was
erroneous or possibly even illegitimate as a strictly legal matter, as some
have argued. Among the relevant considerations, the lack of a constitutional
norm forbidding the federal government from discriminating against racial
minorities was a serious moral deficiency in the preexisting constitutional
regime. In my view, the moral importance of the situation would have
justified the Court in appealing less to the letter of positive law than to
principles of moral right and what Lincoln termed 'the better angels of our
nature' in calling upon the parties and the nation to accept its decision as
deserving of lawful status. 37
While moral legitimacy can guide interpretation, theorists who
believe that the Constitution derives moral legitimacy from result-based
considerations do not necessarily have a theory of legitimacy that actually
drives their method of interpretation. As Professor Adam Samaha observes,
such theorists may have a normative standard that they apply directly both
to constitutional interpretation and to the evaluation of constitutional
legitimacy. 3m Or they may skip any consideration of constitutional
legitimacy and proceed immediately to evaluate methods of interpretation
on consequentialist grounds; some of the arguments considered in this
Part of the Article are of that nature. Still, even if a result-based theory
of moral legitimacy does not generate or drive a result-based theory of
interpretation, the one may license the other. I may say, for example, that
if the moral legitimacy of the Constitution was based only on popular
sovereignty, it might be wrong to evaluate methods of interpretation
134 Fallon, supra note 2, at 1835.
135 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,5 0 0(1954).
136 Fallon,supra note 2, at 1835 n.216.
137 Id. at 1835 (quoting Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, i861), in
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 224 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed.,
1989)). In support of this result-based approach to the moral legitimacy of Boiling, Fallon
also appeals to what I have called exclusion-specific nonoriginalism. See infra notes 211-14
and accompanying text.
138 Samaha, supra note 45, at 651.
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based on consequentialist considerations; but since the moral legitimacy
of the Constitution is itself largely consequentialist, there is no bar to a
consequentialist evaluation of methods of interpretation.
A. Moral Legitimacy from Nonoriginalist Results
I believe that the Constitution has greater result-based moral legitimacy
because of past departures from originalism. These legitimacy-enhancing
departures from originalism have involved nonoriginalist judicial restraint,
nonoriginalist judicial review, and nonoriginalist behavior by non-judicial
political actors. They have occurred in at least three major areas: equality
and nondiscrimination, the establishment and judicial acceptance of the
welfare state, and the expansion of personal liberty.
The foregoing brief paragraph contains massively controversial
assertions. I cannot begin to justify them. But to the extent it is accepted
that the moral legitimacy of the Constitution derives in part from past
nonoriginalist decisions, the legitimacy of nonoriginalist constitutional
interpretation may be enhanced.
While I cannot address the enormous swath of contested issues raised
by my assertion of nonoriginalist moral legitimacy, I will focus briefly on
the elimination of the original exclusions. Few, probably, would dispute
that the elimination of the original exclusions (falling under the "equality
and nondiscrimination" rubric discussed above) has increased the moral
legitimacy of the Constitution. More controversial is the issue of to what
extent the elimination of the original exclusions was accomplished in
nonoriginalist fashion.
As discussed above, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
have a shaky originalist pedigree.139 It might be wondered whether the
legitimacy-enhancing nonoriginalist political behavior that produced the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments can be grouped together with,
and can justifyjudicial nonoriginalism. If the only nonoriginalist behavior
that augmented the moral legitimacy of the Constitution was political
nonoriginalism, that might be a telling concern. But the elimination of the
original exclusions has involved a mix of political nonoriginalism and judicial
nonoriginalism. Moreover, the validity of the Fourteenth Amendment was
challenged in court during the Civil Rights movement,' 40 and the Supreme
Court did discuss and affirm the validity of the Fourteenth Amendment in
a 1939 case concerning the proposed Child Labor Amendment. 4 , To the
139 Seesupra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
140 See Md. Petition Comm. v. Johnson, 265 F. Supp. 823 (D. Md. 1967), aff'd, 391 F2d
933 (4th Cir. 1968); United States v. Ass'n of Citizens Councils, 187 F Supp. 846 (W.D. La.
196o); United States v. Gugel, iig F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Ky. 1954). These cases are noted in
Greenawalt, supra note 13o, at 641 n.56; see also U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
141 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433,448-50 (1939).
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extent the Fourteenth Amendment is questionable on originalist grounds,
the decisions upholding it are also questionable on originalist grounds.
As noted, the school desegregation decisions in Brown'4 and Boiling,43
are certainly questionable on originalist grounds."4 Also questionable are
laws prohibiting private discrimination and the decisions upholding these
laws under Congress' commerce power. 145 The Nineteenth Amendment
appears to have a good originalist pedigree; 146 however, equal protection
doctrine in the area of gender is on very shaky ground. 147
As to the exclusion of the poor, through property qualifications and poll
taxes, the improvements once again have a mixed originalist pedigree. The
Twenty-Fourth Amendment (prohibiting poll taxes in federal elections)
14
is unobjectionable on originalist grounds, as is the state-law expansion
of the franchise. However, the Supreme Court's decisions invalidating
property qualifications' 49 and state-election poll taxes' s can be criticized
on originalist grounds. One critic, as to property qualifications, is Justice
Scalia.
151
In summary, the original exclusions were eliminated, over time, through
measures that were often questionable on originalist grounds. If the
elimination of the original exclusions has increased the moral legitimacy
of the Constitution, perhaps future nonoriginalist interpretation requires
less justification than originalists believe. I am tentative in stating this
conclusion because it does not ineluctably follow from what has gone before.
It is possible to believe that past legitimacy-enhancing nonoriginalism
does not justify future nonoriginalism. As discussed below in Part III, it is
even possible to believe that past nonoriginalist improvements have made
142 Brown v. Board of Ed. 347 U.S. 483 ('954).
143 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
144 See supra notes z6, 135-37 and accompanying text.
145 Compare Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 242-43 (1964)
(upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), with United States v. Lopez, 5 14 U.S. 549,
587 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The Constitution ... does not support the proposition
that Congress has authority over all activities that 'substantially affect' interstate commerce.");
see also U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
146 Consider, however, that the Nineteenth Amendment was challenged, unsuccess-
fully, in Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
147 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[In
my view the function of this Court is to preserve our society's values regarding (among other
things) equal protection, not to revise them; to prevent backsliding from the degree of restric-
tion the Constitution imposed upon democratic government, not to prescribe, on our own
authority, progressively higher degrees.") (emphasis in original).
148 U.S. CONsT. amend. XXIV.
149 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 675 (1966).
15o Id. at 664.
151 Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION,
supra note I8, at 42.
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future nonoriginalism less necessary.
B. McGinnis and Rappaport
Originalists as well as nonoriginalists can claim to draw support from
result-based moral legitimacy. A particularly audacious argument in favor
of originalism, on the ground that it produces good results, is offered by
McGinnis and Rappaport.' McGinnis and Rappaport argue, based
on theoretical considerations of public choice, that legal norms created
through rules requiring supermajority consent will produce desirable
results. Because our Constitution was created through supermajority
rules, they argue, it produces desirable results. And since the original
meaning of the constitutional provisions was the meaning subjected to the
supermajoritarian process, courts should adhere to that meaning, at the risk




All parts of McGinnis and Rappaport's argument are debatable.
As Professor Ethan Leib has observed, there is disagreement among
public-choice scholars as to the merit of supermajority rules.' 14 Critics of
supermajority rules observe that they privilege the status quo.' As it may
be possible to improve on the status quo, we should not uncritically accept
the premise that supermajority rules tend to produce better results.
But McGinnis and Rappaport's factual premise, that the Constitution
was adopted through supermajority rules, is even more problematic.
That premise is simply false-the Constitution was adopted not by a
supermajority, but by a subminority. Moreover, McGinnis and Rappaport
essentially concede that the Constitution was not approved under a
supermajority process endorsed by their theory. They lament the exclusion




and then state: "[Tihese exclusions go to the theoretical heart of the
152 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note i i. In a later article, McGinnis and Rappaport
specify that their criterion for evaluating the goodness of results is utilitarian. John 0.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Desirable Constitution and the Case for Originalism 5
n.4 (San Diego Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 08-022). That is also my ultimate criterion
for evaluating the goodness of results. Thus, the disagreement I express with McGinnis and
Rappaport is one among utilitarians.
153 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note i i. I have addressed McGinnis and Rappaport's
theory in Part I, as they essentially argue that mere ratification confers moral legitimacy. In
McGinnis and Rappaport's argument, however, it is not the process of ratification itself that
confers moral legitimacy, but the asserted tendency of supermajority ratification to produce
good results.
154 Ethan J. Leib, Why Supermajoritarianism Does Not Illuminate the Debate Between
Originalists and Non-Originalists, IoI Nw. U. L. REV. 1905 (2007).
155 Id. at 191o.
156 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note i t, at 394-95. They appear to be aware of the
exclusion of the poor in light of a subsequent reference to "white, male property owners," but
they do not actually mention it. Id. at 395.
[Vol. 98
2009-2010] ORIGINALISM AND ORIGINAL EXCLUSIONS 427
supermajoritarian argument: the desirability of supermajority rules requires
that all interests be reflected in the electorate."' 57
Despite this admirable concession that an essential premise of their
argument is false, McGinnis and Rappaport gamely assert that "from
today's perspective these defects in the Constitution have been corrected.
... [T]he Constitution now grants all people the freedoms of white, male
property owners.... [T]he Constitution has now been corrected to provide
equal rights to all Americans."' 8 In a footnote, they continue:
While here we have addressed the most obvious defects arising from the
exclusion of women and African-Americans from the framing, it might be
argued that their absence caused subtler, more wide-ranging problems.
Under this view, these groups would have not only sought equality
provisions, but would also have had a different substantive agenda. We do
not, however, believe that one can make a strong case that the Constitution
would have been systematically different had these excluded groups been
included. In the absence of strong evidence that the Constitution would
have been transformed by these other voters, the original Constitution's
rules should be followed, because they still offer the best evidence of what
good entrenchments would have resembled.
159
As detailed at length by Professor Paul Finkelman, the original
Constitution's accommodation with slavery and the slave trade is reflected
in several provisions that persist to this day.160 McGinnis and Rappaport also
fail even to mention the exclusion of the white male poor, through property
qualifications and poll taxes, from the production of the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights. The exclusion of the white male poor was accentuated by
the exclusion of women, African-Americans, and Native Americans, as all
of the latter excluded groups were doubtless poorer on average than white
males. Though their reference to "white, male property owners" 161 suggests
that they are aware of the exclusion of the poor, McGinnis and Rappaport
do not consider what effect it may have had upon the Constitution. Thus,
McGinnis and Rappaport's blithe assertion that today's Constitution is
unaffected by original exclusions does not inspire confidence.
But these problems aside, McGinnis and Rappaport's attempt to
allocate the historical burden of proof in their favor is inconsistent with
their own theory. Should we presume that the Constitution in its original
meaning produces desirable results unless there is "strong evidence"
that the exclusion from politics of all but a privileged minority changed
157 Id. at 395-
158 Id. at 395-96.
159 Id. at 396 n.55.
i6o FINKELMAN, supra note 1o, at 3-36.
161 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note i i, at 395.
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constitutional provisions or their meaning for the worse? 6 ' Under McGinnis
and Rappaport's own theory, the presumption should be reversed. Since
there was no supermajority, and in fact several classes of people (constituting
the majority of people) were excluded, we should not presume that the
original meaning of the provisions of the antebellum Constitution produce
desirable results.
McGinnis and Rappaport's argument for the beneficence of the original
meaning of the Constitution, it will be remembered, is theoretical. They
do not survey all the provisions of today's Constitution, determine that their
original meanings are good according to some normative standard, and then
demand proof that the original exclusions of the past have contaminated
those provisions.'63 Instead, they simply assume that the original meaning
of the original constitutional provisions produces good results because those
provisions were adopted under a supermajoritarian process. When this
premise proves false-as they themselves concede-their entire argument
must collapse. Just as the original exclusions defeat Whittington's popular
sovereignty and his reciprocal originalism, they also defeat McGinnis and
Rappaport's consequentialist originalism.
The only kind of supermajority support that the original Constitution
can claim is a supermajority of ruling minority interests in each state-a
regional supermajority. Unfortunately, the Constitutional provisions that
most obviously resulted from a desire to achieve a regional supermajority
are the provisions protecting the African slave trade. Only the three deeper-
South states-South Carolina, North Carolina and Georgia-wanted
the Constitution to protect the slave trade, but they were able to obtain
protection of the slave trade by threatening to withhold ratification. 16 At
the Constitutional Convention, John Rutledge of South Carolina is reported
to have said: "If the Convention thinks that N.C.; S.C. & Georgia will ever
agree to the plan, unless their right to import slaves be untouched, the
expectation is vain. The people of those States will never be such fools as
to give up so important an interest."'165
McGinnis and Rappaport do not specifically mention the constitutional
provisions protecting the slave trade. On the Constitution's protection of
slavery in general, they write:
A serious attempt to eliminate slavery would have defeated any constitution
and probably caused a fracturing of the nation. Despite its acquiescence
to slavery, the original Constitution contributed to a social order based
162 Id. at 396 n.55.
163 McGinnis and Rappaport do mention federalism and the Bill of Rights as examples
of beneficent original meaning. Id. at 389.
164 Although they opposed the slave trade, Virginia and Maryland had what they consid-
ered a surplus of slaves. FINKELMAN, supra note 1o, at 27.
165 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTiON OF 1787, supra note 52, at 373.
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on markets and freedoms that helped persuade Americans that slavery is
wrong. It seems unlikely that African Americans would have been better
off with a failure of the Constitution in 1789 and a retreat to sectional
governments.'66
This argument could be extended to address the specific provisions
protecting the African slave trade. 167 With this move, however, McGinnis
and Rappaport's theory takes on a distinctly Panglossian character. Their
argument for the good consequences of originalism is based on the false
premise of supermajority approval. When the lack of supermajority
approval is pointed out, they must shift to the dubious argument that a
regional supermajority of ruling minority interests can substitute for a
true supermajority. When the provisions protecting the African slave trade
are identified as those most obviously resulting from a desire to achieve a
regional supermajority, they must shift again, retreating from the argument
that the approval process resulted in good provisions (the thrust of their
theory all along) to an argument that the bad provisions were not as bad as
having no constitution at all.
C. Moral Progress
Relying on the original exclusions, I now offer an argument for the
substantive undesirability of originalist constitutional law that is, in a
way, the mirror image of the public-choice argument of McGinnis and
Rappaport that I rejected in the previous Section. There has been moral
progress since the Constitution required the return of fugitive slaves and
protected the slave trade, and since the franchise was basically limited to
propertied white men. As the antebellum Constitution and the political
culture that produced it were morally inferior in these respects, it makes
sense to assume that they were morally inferior in other respects as well.
Further, since the Constitution is so hard to amend, it makes sense to
assume that there remain provisions that are morally problematic, at least if
interpreted according to their original meaning. To achieve the benefits of
moral progress, we should allow the meaning of these provisions to drift in
a process of common-law constitutionalism.
So while McGinnis and Rappaport blithely assume that the abolition of
slavery and the expansion of the franchise excised from the Constitution
all provisions with a morally questionable original meaning, I submit that
the reverse is more likely true: the existence of some morally retrograde
provisions suggests that there are other morally retrograde provisions,
166 Id. at 395.
167 Finkelman would object because he believes that the deeper-South states were
bluffing in their insistence that the Constitution protect the slave trade. FINKELMAN, supra
note Io, at 31.
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and also perhaps morally retrograde omissions. And for this part of the
argument, it does not much matter which normative theory one adopts.
Under basically all views, it was moral progress to eliminate the original
exclusions of the antebellum Constitution and its political culture-
whether one is a utilitarian, an egalitarian, a libertarian, a neo-Aristotelian,
or a conservative of almost any contemporary variety.
The argument from moral progress assumes that judges engaged in
common-law constitutionalism can move away from the morally retrograde
parts of the Constitution's original meaning while preserving the noble
parts of its original meaning. This is not a heroic assumption: judges are
part of the political and legal culture that has experienced moral progress.
16 8
But like many nonoriginalist arguments considered in this Article, the
argument from moral progress is somewhat better as an argument against
originalist judicial review than as an argument for nonoriginalist judicial
review. If contemporary judges have benefited from moral progress, so, one
would assume, have contemporary legislatures. At least where a federal
statute is concerned, the argument from moral progress does not seem, in
itself, to justify nonoriginalist judicial review. Nevertheless, it might justify
the courts in bringing straggler states into line with majority state practice.
The idea of moral progress as a counterweight to originalism is front
and center in United States v. Virginia [herein VMI], 16 9 one of the most
unapologetically nonoriginalist Supreme Court decisions. In VMI, the
Court held that it was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment for the state of Virginia to deny women admission
to a state military school.170 Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg asserted
the moral inferiority of the historical treatment of women in American
society.171 In effect, this was a preemptive strike against the originalist
argument for state-supported single-sex military schools: yes, the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment (or the ratifiers, or the public of the time)
probably did not think that it prohibited state-supported, single-sex,
military schools, but they also thought the Fourteenth Amendment was
consistent with laws and practices that we know to be morally insupportable.
Therefore, we need not consult the original meaning further.
Justice Ginsburg's opinion in VMI provoked a memorable dissent from
Justice Scalia:
Much of the Court's opinion is devoted to deprecating the closed-
168 See DOUGLAS E. EDLIN, JUDGES AND UNJUST LAWS: COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 121-24 (2008).
169 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
170 Id. at 519.
171 Id. at 531 ("Today's skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportuni-
ties based on sex responds to volumes of history .... "). The response was not to embrace
history, but to reject it. Id.
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mindedness of our forebears with regard to women's education, and even
with regard to the treatment of women in areas that have nothing to do with
education. Closed minded they were-as every age is, including our own,
with regard to matters it cannot guess, because it simply does not consider
them debatable. The virtue of a democratic system with a First Amendment
is that it readily enables the people, over time, to be persuaded that what
they took for granted is not so, and to change their laws accordingly. That
system is destroyed if the smug assurances of each age are removed from the
democratic process and written into the Constitution. So to counterbalance
the Court's criticism of our ancestors, let me say a word in their praise: They
left us free to change. The same cannot be said of this most illiberal Court,
which has embarked on a course of inscribing one after another of the current
preferences of the society (and in some cases only the counter-majoritarian
preferences of the society's law-trained elite) into our Basic Law.1
72
The appeal to democracy in Justice Scalia's dissent is so forceful that it
bears repeating that originalism is not restraint. By some measures, Justice
Scalia believes our forbears left us less "free to change"' 171 than his liberal
nonoriginalist colleagues. 74 But leaving that aside, it is striking how Justice
Scalia is driven here almost to moral skepticism by Justice Ginsburg's
assertion of moral progress.
Moral skepticism is one possible originalist response to the nonoriginalist
argument from moral progress. In general, moral skepticism can be an ally
of formalism, including originalist formalism: if we cannot know what is
morally right, we might as well exclude moral considerations. However,
the moral skeptic is typically on the defensive against the moral advocate.
Justice Scalia himself, famously, appeared to endorse a moral-progress
exception to originalism in his 1989 article Originalism: The Lesser Evil.
17
In that article, he suggested that he could not uphold, as consistent with
the Eighth Amendment, 7 6 some punishments that were not "cruel and
unusual" under the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, but are
considered "cruel and unusual" today.'
7
A more vigorous originalist response to the argument from moral progress
would be to assert that there has been moral decay, as well as moral progress,
over the life of the Constitution.'78 Allegations of moral decay could be
172 Id. at 566-67 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173 Id.
174 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
175 Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, supra note 18, at 861-64.
176 U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
177 Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, supra note 18, at 864.
178 Scalia has also suggested this, at least as a possibility: "I'm afraid that societies don't
always mature. Sometimes they rot. What makes you think that, you know, human progress is
one upwardly inclined plane every day and every way we get better and better? It seems to
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raised against various decisions asserted to be nonoriginalist, such as Roe v.
Wade' 9 and the school prayer decisions.' The originalist could then argue
that since the original meaning is at least sometimes morally superior to
nonoriginalist decisions, we cannot assume that it is only originalism, rather
than nonoriginalism, that prevents the realization of moral progress.
Ultimately, then, the force of the argument from moral progress depends
on the extent to which one believes there has been moral progress, as
opposed to moral decay, from the time of the antebellum Constitution
to our own time. I believe that there has mostly been moral progress (a
position I will not attempt to justify here), so that the argument from moral
progress has some force. There may be countervailing considerations, but
it should at least be recognized that the argument from moral progress
is more convincing than McGinnis and Rappaport's consequentialist
originalist argument; that argument has no force at all because it relies on a
false premise of supermajority approval.
D. Other Nonoriginalist Considerations
Other consequentialist considerations have been adduced both for
and against originalism. I now rapidly review and endorse some familiar
nonoriginalist considerations. As they have little to do with original
exclusions, I do not explore them in detail.
First, the original meaning of older constitutional provisions is old.
Regardless of whether the original meaning is morally retrograde, it may be
inappropriate for contemporary life. 8' Second, originalism is destabilizing;
as Professor David Strauss and others have argued, originalism is inherently
less respectful of precedent than is common-law constitutionalism.18
While originalists differ among themselves in their respect for precedent,1 13
me that the purpose of the Bill of Rights was to prevent change, not to encourage it and have
it written into a Constitution." Full Written Transcript of Scalia-Breyer Debate on Foreign
Law, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1352357/posts (Feb. 27, 2005, 20:44:50 EST)
[hereinafter Scalia-Breyer Debate].
179 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (i973).
18o See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203 (1963).
18I See Primus, supra note 29, at 177. For a response, see McGinnis & Rappaport, supra
note I, at 393-94.
18z David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn't Be Onginalists, 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POI'Y
969 (2oo8) [hereinafter Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn't Be Originalists]; David A. Strauss,
Originalism, Precedent, and Candor, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 299, 300-01 (zoo5); David A. Strauss,
Common Law, Common Ground, and Jeff erson's Principle, 112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1729 (2003); David
A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CH1. L. REv. 877, 879 (1996); see also
Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CoNsT.
COMMENT. 271, 271-73 (2005).
183 See Scalia, Response, supra note 23, at 138-40 (asserting that the doctrine of stare de-
cisis is a limitation on originalist method); Barnett, Trumping Precedent, supra note 21, 257-58
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it is fair to say that they are, on average, less respectful of precedent than
nonoriginalists. Third, Strauss is also convincing in arguing that originalism
suppresses candor. Originalists, like nonoriginalists, pursue favored results,
but "[t]he temptation, for an originalist, is to 'discover' that the original
understanding about some controversial issue is, conveniently, identical to
one's own views. " 184
Though I have breezed through these arguments, I do not wish to
denigrate their importance. The inference that original meaning may be
inappropriate to contemporary life is doubtless more important than the
inference, discussed at length above, that original meaning may be morally
retrograde. Strauss's arguments are very important because they hit at
the appeal of originalism to formalists, at both the doctrinal level and the
psychological level. Formalism offers a kind of theoretical stability, but that
can seem less attractive if it is purchased at the cost of real-life instability
in the law and in the lives of people.
III. CONTEMPORARY CONSENT
Result-based legitimacy probably has some appeal to most of us, but
it is also probably troubling to most of us. In this Part, I return to consent-
based arguments. As discussed in Part I, a popular-sovereignty justification
for judicial review cannot convincingly be advanced in the face of original
exclusions, at least as to provisions that originated in the antebellum
Constitution. An alternative strategy is to justify judicial review by reliance
on some form of contemporary consent. Possibly the moral legitimacy
necessary to justify judicial review comes from the sociological legitimacy
of the Constitution, or of the Supreme Court, or of judicial review itself. Or
possibly we can characterize federal judges as indirectly elected, rather than
unelected, so as to portray judicial review as part of ordinary democratic
politics. Once again, I will move rapidly through some issues that have
little relation to the original exclusions.
A. Sociological Legitimacy
As noted, the sociological legitimacy of a constitution refers to its
acceptance by citizens. There are various possible measures of sociological
legitimacy, from weak (acquiescence) to strong (active endorsement).,1 5
The American Constitution enjoys considerable sociological legitimacy.
186
(expressing an anti-precedent view); Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage:
Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 155, 159 (2006) (expressing a pro-precedent view).
184 Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn't Be Originalists, supra note 182, at 974.
185 Fallon, supra note 2, at 1795-96.
186 See, e.g., GFK CUSTOM RESEARCH NORTH AMERIcA, AP-NATIONAL CONSTITUTION
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While it is important to distinguish sociological legitimacy from moral
legitimacy, we may think that the sociological legitimacy of the Constitution
contributes to its moral legitimacy"7 and further gives some indication of
how the Constitution should be interpreted.
1. A Contemporary Phenomenon.- As sociological legitimacy is based
on the views of contemporary people, the Constitution should arguably
be interpreted according to a contemporary meaning, even when that is
different from the Constitution's original meaning. Arguing along these
lines, Professor Michael Dorf writes:
For living Constitutionalists, the act of ratification by people who are long
dead, and whose numbers did not include any women or enslaved African-
Americans, does not suffice to make the Constitution effective today. For
us living-Constitutionalists, the Constitution's current authority derives at
least in substantial part from the fact that we the living people accept it as
authoritative. And if our acceptance validates the Constitution, then,...
the way in which contemporary Americans understand the Constitution's
language should play a substantial role in how the courts interpret that
language.188
This is a nonoriginalist argument of the kind suggested above in Part I.
The problem of original exclusions, as well as the "dead hand" argument,
is used to dispose of original ratification as a source of moral legitimacy.
Then the way is clear to propose a different source of moral legitimacy-in
this case, sociological legitimacy-that arguably points to a nonoriginalist
approach to interpretation.
However, the argument that the sociological component of moral
legitimacy privileges contemporary meaning is once again more powerful
as an argument against originalist judicial review than as an argument in
favor of nonoriginalist judicial review. Legislators, as well as judges, have a
contemporary understanding. As Justice Scalia puts it,
CENTER POLL 2009, http://www.ap-gfkpoll.com/pdf/APGfK_Poll_ConstitutionTopline.pdf
(last visited Oct. 20, 2009). In this poll, 75% of respondents agreed with the statement that
"[tihe United States Constitution is an enduring document that remains relevant today," as
opposed to 23% who agreed with the statement that "[t]he United States Constitution is an
outdated document that needs to be modernized." Id. Those who agreed with the second
statement might still be considered supporters of the Constitution if they favored "modern-
ization" through Article V amendment or judicial interpretation. On the other hand, those
who agreed with the first statement that the Constitution "remains relevant" might not be
expressing very strong support.
187 That is my view, not necessarily Fallon's.
188 Michael C. Doff, Who Killedthe "Living Constitution"?, FINDLAW, Mar. Io, zoo8, http://
writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/2oo8o3i o.html.
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If the Constitution were... a novel invitation to apply current societal values,
what reason would there be to believe that the invitation was addressed to
the courts rather than to the legislature? One simply cannot say, regarding
that sort of novel enactment, that "[it is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department" to determine its content. Quite to the
contrary, the legislature would seem a much more appropriate expositor of
social values, and its determination that a statute is compatible with the
Constitution should, as in England, prevail."8
Scalia's point is powerful. The sociological component of moral
legitimacy does not seem, in itself, to justify nonoriginalist judicial review,
at least where a federal statute is concerned. Once again, however, the
privileging of contemporary meaning could justify the courts in bringing
straggler states into line with majority state practice.
The Supreme Court as an institution also has considerable sociological
legitimacy.19° In theory, a method of constitutional interpretation could
have sociological legitimacy (or could lack sociological legitimacy).
But, as Fallon says, "the public's relative lack of attentiveness makes it
impossible to gauge the substantive sociological legitimacy-in the strong
sense of active endorsement-of controversial methods of constitutional
interpretation."1 9'
Even if the sociological legitimacy of the Court does not directly
extend to any particular method of constitutional interpretation, it does
plausibly extend to the practice of judicial review itself. As Professor Barry
Friedman argues, judicial review may be part of what people accept, even
if they support the law that has been struck down.19 Perhaps, then, the
countermajoritarian difficulty becomes less difficult for both originalists
and nonoriginalists.
2. Indirect Sociological Legitimaty of Nonoriginalist Doctrine.- Though
methods of constitutional interpretation cannot claim direct sociological
legitimacy, popular acceptance of the results of these methods might give
them indirect legitimacy. As indicated in the Introduction, major elements
of Supreme Court doctrine are widely perceived as nonoriginalist. To
the extent that nonoriginalist doctrine has sociological legitimacy, the
nonoriginalist method could have some indirect sociological legitimacy.
To be sure, some liberal Supreme Court decisions perceived as
189 Scalia, Onginalism: The Lesser Evil, supra note I8, at 854.
19o See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1828-3o; Lydia Saad, High Court to Start Term With Near
Decade-High Approval, GALLUP, Sept. 9, 2oo9, http://www.gallup.com/poll/I 22858/High-Court-
Start-Term-Near-Decade-High-Approval.aspx.
191 Fallon, supra note 2, at I83O.
192 Barry Friedman, JudgingJuditial Review: Marbury in the Modern Era: Mediated Popular
Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 26o6, 26o8, 2631 (2003).
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nonoriginalist have provoked great political opposition. In at least two
areas-abortion and school prayer-it is unlikely that liberal nonoriginalism
will ever be able to claim even weak sociological legitimacy. Yet in a number
of areas, especially those relating to the elimination of original exclusions,
liberal nonoriginalism does seem to have some indirect sociological
legitimacy. Each inclusion of a previously-excluded group was controversial
at one point, but each subsequently gained wide acceptance.'93
In Part II above, I argued that the elimination of the original exclusions,
accomplished partly through nonoriginalist means, had increased the
result-based moral legitimacy of the Constitution. I am now suggesting
that the consent-based moral legitimacy of the Constitution, as well, is
partly based on the wide acceptance of nonoriginalist improvements such
as the elimination of the original exclusions. This puts into ironic relief
Judge McConnell's observation, which he takes to support originalism
and traditionalism, that "women and African-Americans ... today are no
more inclined than any other portions of the population to jettison the
Constitution."'' " Perhaps McConnell is right; but perhaps women and
African-Americans, as well as members of other groups, would venerate
the Constitution less if it had been interpreted in a consistently originalist
manner. Insofar as the sociological legitimacy of the Constitution derives, in
part, from nonoriginalist improvements, originalists who rely on sociological
legitimacy may be claiming justification from a nonoriginalist source.
Paradoxically, originalists do seem in general to gain some benefit from
the increase in result-based moral legitimacy and consent-based moral
legitimacy that nonoriginalism has brought to the Constitution. The older
generation of originalists wanted to roll back liberal nonoriginalism, and
some contemporary originalists certainly share that goal. But originalism
today can also appeal to those who believe that liberal nonoriginalism,
though once justified, is no longer necessary. The work of nonoriginalist
constitutional improvement, they might think, has already been done-by
the Reconstruction Congress, the New Deal Democrats, the majoritarian
New Deal Court, and the liberal Warren and Burger Courts. Even with a turn
to originalism, most nonoriginalist constitutional improvements are unlikely
to be undone, for several reasons. First, respect for political settlement
and judicial precedent will limit the decisions that originalists are willing
or able to revisit. Second, favored precedents that were once considered
nonoriginalist can be provided with retroactive originalist justification, as
with Brown. 95 Third, public mores have changed so that some kinds of
legislative action that previously provoked liberal nonoriginalist judicial
review (such as egregiously sexist laws) are now less likely. Previous
193 See supra notes 128-31, 139-5o and accompanying text.
194 McConnell, supra note i i, at 1132-33.
195 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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constitutional interpreters, it might be thought, have done the dirty work of
nonoriginalist constitutional improvement, and their success now licenses
us to be originalists, without suffering the constitutional consequences that
originalism would have brought in the past.
I am not sure that the view just described is theoretically coherent. As
a theoretical matter, I believe, future nonoriginalism is bolstered to the
extent that past nonoriginalism has contributed to the moral legitimacy of
the Constitution. As a practical matter, however, originalists may be trading
on nonoriginalist legitimacy to some extent.
3. Veneration of the Founders.- Popular sovereignty at the Founding is a
myth, and public acceptance of this myth cannot make it true. If we accept
the Founders as representing the People of the Founding, that doesn't
make white male property owners "the People," just as thirteen governors
wouldn't be "the People" if we were to accept them as such. However,
public acceptance of the myth of popular sovereignty at the Founding
might lend some indirect sociological legitimacy to popular-sovereignty
originalism.
Veneration of the Founders could also give support to a different kind
of originalism, a folk originalism that is rarely advocated in academic circles.
Folk originalism tells us that the Founders were wise and great. We lesser
mortals should be guided by their will and should not tinker with their
handiwork. 196
Veneration of the Founders and acceptance of the myth of popular
sovereignty doubtless play a role in sustaining originalism. Nevertheless,
I deny that these elements of popular culture provide much sociological
legitimacy for originalism, because they coexist with acceptance of the
great improvements that Americans have made to their Constitution, some
in nonoriginalist fashion. As before, past nonoriginalist achievements make
it paradoxically easier for us to indulge ourselves in mythology about the
Founders and the Founding; it would be harder to venerate the Founders
if we actually had to live under their Constitution.
4. Sociological Legitimacy and Result-Based Legitimacy.- Legitimacy based
on contemporary consent is not a value that is wholly independent from
result-based legitimacy. One goal in the development of the law can be
the retention of sociological legitimacy. It might be thought, for example,
that Roe v. Wade'97 simultaneously increased the moral legitimacy of the
Constitution, because of the rule it adopted, and decreased the moral
legitimacy of the Constitution, because it provoked unending disapproval
by a substantial segment of the population.
I96 Whittington rejects this folk originalism as inconsistent with continuing popular sov-
ereignty. See WHITINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 126.
197 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-67 (973).
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B. Indirect Election of Federal Judges
Though Supreme Court justices are not directly elected, they are
appointed by an elected president and confirmed by an elected Senate. 198
To one degree or another, Professors Barry Friedman, Jack Balkin, Sanford
Levinson, Robert Post, and Reva Siegel have all justified (or partially
justified) judicial review as part of ordinary democratic politics. 199 If we
accept that the Supreme Court is part of ordinary democratic politics,
the countermajoritarian difficulty once again becomes less difficult both
for originalist judicial review and for nonoriginalist judicial review. When
indirectly elected judges override legislatures, that does not seem to require
as much justification as when "unelected judges" override legislatures.
The concept of indirect election can provide a nonoriginalist response
to one originalist argument that may be provoked by a discussion of the
original exclusions. Originalists may argue that nonoriginalism recapitulates
the original exclusions, except in far more objectionable form. By
departing from original meaning, five justices on the Supreme Court can
make a law;zt ° that is a far smaller and far more privileged minority than the
minority responsible for creating and ratifying the antebellum Constitution.
This is, of course, more powerful as an argument against nonoriginalist
judicial review than against nonoriginalist judicial restraint. Nonoriginalist
judicial restraint can draw on the democratic legitimacy of contemporary
majorities in upholding a contemporary law. But even as to nonoriginalist
judicial review, nonoriginalists can claim that contemporary presidents
and contemporary senators are elected under a broadened franchise in a
free society, thus providing the contemporary Supreme Court with greater
(albeit indirect) democratic legitimacy than any antebellum body. Both
originalists and nonoriginalists can draw on the asserted legitimacy of
indirect democracy, but nonoriginalists may need it more.
198 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
i99 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From
Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDrAM L. REV. 489,494-95 (2oo6);
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV.
1045, lO67-68 (zoox); Friedman, supra note 192, at 26o6; Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage:
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 373, 375 (2007).
200 See Steven G. Calabresi, A Critical Introduction to the Originalism Debate, 31 HARv. J.L.
& PuB. PoL'y 875, 88o-8i (2OO8) ("Five out of nine Justices would then have the power, for
example, to eliminate the death penalty, even though a comparatively trivial bill to deregulate
the trucking industry would need to pass the House of Representatives, overcome a filibuster
and pass the Senate, and then be signed by the President-or be passed by two-thirds majori-
ties of both Houses over the President's veto-in order to become law. What are the odds that
the Framers, who created our cumbersome system for national law-making, meant to give
five-to-four majorities of the Supreme Court the power to legislate on the most sensitive is-
sues of morality and religion?").
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Locating judicial review in ordinary democratic politics could
provide originalists, in their turn, with a ready-made response to one
liberal nonoriginalist argument based on sociological legitimacy. Liberal
nonoriginalists may argue that their approach has some sociological
legitimacy, albeit of the very weak variety, because not a single liberal
precedent has been overturned by constitutional amendment. However,
a number of liberal precedents have become issues in presidential
campaigns won by Republicans, and those Republican presidents have
made appointments leading to the undermining or rejection of some
liberal precedents (not necessarily the same ones that figured in the
campaigns).,0'
On the other hand, the very pretension of originalism to avoid result-
oriented judging means that originalist judicial review may not always be
able to claim the fullest extent of indirect democratic legitimacy. When
Republican presidents are elected on a gun-rights platform and appoint
originalist judges, who in turn determine that there is an individual right
to bear arms under the Second Amendment, 22 this arguably has indirect
democratic legitimacy. But if originalist judges were to impose a narrow
vision of the eighteenth century understanding of the Commerce Clause,
as Justice Thomas has urged, 03 the argument for indirect democratic
legitimacy would be much weaker. So ironically, the more originalism
is a genuine attempt to discover original meanings, rather than a pose
covering clearly understood conservative politics, the less democratic
legitimacy it may have-that is, unless originalism itself becomes an issue
in election campaigns. Until now, of course, it has been more persuasive
that Republican voters vote for conservative results than that they vote for
the originalist method.2°4
C. Consent over Time
The Constitution has enjoyed sociological legitimacy over time in the
minds of successive generations of Americans. Plausibly, the continuing
sociological legitimacy of the Constitution contributes more to its
democratic legitimacy, and its moral legitimacy, than would its sociological
legitimacy to contemporary people alone. That is my view, though I believe
that contemporary sociological legitimacy is far more important than past
sociological legitimacy. Past sociological legitimacy may seem relevant to
us because we believe that it shows that present sociological legitimacy will
2o i See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 704 (2009) (undermining the exclu-
sionary rule); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2516-1 7 (2009)
(undermining the Voting Rights Act).
202 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791 (2008).
203 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57-59 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
204 See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1830.
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continue in the future.
IV. EXCLUSION-SPECIFIC NONORIGINALISM
I have so far discussed the general significance of original exclusions for
constitutional interpretation, regardless of whether the original meaning of
the constitutional provision at issue was plausibly affected by an original
exclusion, and regardless of whether application of that provision affects
a previously-excluded class. If one or both of these conditions apply, the
case for nonoriginalism is arguably stronger. A direct connection between
an original exclusion and a current constitutional issue might also give
some guidance in resolving the constitutional issue, though here there are
complications and paradoxes.
A. Examples Involving Landmark Cases
Constitutional theorists have used exclusion-specific nonoriginalism to
justify some major decisions. In his famous article titled The Misconceived
Quest for the Original Understanding,05 Professor Paul Brest suggests such
a justification for Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell. 6 In Blaisdell, a
Depression-era case, the Court upheld a state mortgage moratorium law 07
even though the Contract Clause in Article I, Section 10 forbids states
from passing any law "impairing the obligation of contracts."2 °8 Blaisdell
is often considered to be a particularly strong deviation from originalism.20 9
In support of Blaisdell, Brest writes: "[T]he assumption that the contract
clause reflected widely held norms of eighteenth century America is
weakened to the extent that creditors were well-represented and debtors
underrepresented in the Philadelphia and state ratifying conventions." '
Another suggestion of exclusion-specific nonoriginalism can be found
in Fallon's discussion of Bollingv. Sharpe." ' In Bolling, the Court held that
school desegregation in the District of Columbia violated a principle of equal
protection inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."l'
I noted above in Part II that Fallon mentions Bolling as an example of a
case where result-based moral legitimacy is persuasive: "[T]he lack of a
constitutional norm forbidding the federal government from discriminating
against racial minorities was a serious moral deficiency in the preexisting
205 Brest, supra note i i.
206 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (934).
207 Id. at 444-48.
zo8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § io, cl. i.
209 See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 23, at 2093-94.
21o Brest, supra note I I, at 230.
211 See Fallon, supra note 2, at 1835.
212 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
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constitutional regime." ' 3 Fallon also suggests that Bolling is justified as an
exclusion-specific nonoriginalist decision:
It might be objected that by forging a new constitutional norm, the Court
offended principles governing the fair allocation of political power: the
Court should leave the implementation of constitutional change to political
majorities acting through the Article V amendment process, not arrogate a
power of innovation to itself. It bears emphasis, however, that the status
quo ante had been established by political processes from which racial
minorities were almost wholly excluded. Under those circumstances, the
argument that the Court should have stayed its hand based on concerns
about the fair allocation of political power rings slightly hollow.
z14
The application of equal protection principles to gender could also be
considered an area in which exclusion-specific nonoriginalism is justified.
In VMI, Justice Ginsburg noted that women were unable to vote for the
first "century plus three decades and more" of the Constitution, and
were otherwise subordinated."' 5 As indicated above, Ginsburg's opinion
in VMI reflects the view that the historical subordination of women
makes it inappropriate to consult the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment on gender-specific issues2116
B. Recent Proposals
Professors Malla Pollack 1' and R. George Wright 18 have recently
published articles that address exclusion-specific issues at length. Pollack
makes a number of arguments, one of which might be considered the
least ambitious proposal as to how constitutional interpretation should
accommodate original exclusions. Though not herself an originalist, Pollack
argues that public-meaning originalists should include formerly excluded
groups in the "public" when determining meaning.2t 9 Surprisingly, it does
not appear that any major public-meaning originalist has directly addressed
the question of whether the relevant public for determining constitutional
meaning includes formerly excluded groups.2 0 Pollack argues that "[t]hose
213 Fallon, supra note 2, at 1835.
214 Id.
215 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
z16 See id see also supra note 171 and accompanying text.
217 Pollack, supra note i i.
218 Wright, supra note i i.
219 Pollack, supra note i i, at 144.
22o Sometimes it appears implicitly that public-meaning originalists mean to exclude for-
merly disenfranchised groups from the relevant public, as in Bork's statement that Madison's
notes "are merely evidence of what informed public men of the time thought the words of the
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wedded to historicism could increase the legitimacy of their constitutional
interpretations (at least slightly) . . . [by asking] what the entire public
of the United States heard when the document was ratified. This makes
the Constitution more legitimate by providing a method of somewhat
empowering 1789's political outcasts.22 1
Pollack's truly modest proposal would probably have its greatest impact
in cases applying constitutional provisions to previously excluded groups.
For example, if the "public" in 1867 included only men, the Fourteenth
Amendment might have a determinate original meaning that does not
challenge the traditional subordination of women; but if the "public" also
included women, the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
might become indeterminate in this respect.
Wright, for his part, offers an extremely ambitious argument, based on
the original exclusions, for reading "economic subsistence rights" into the
Constitution.zzz He notes that leading liberal nonoriginalists do not claim
that the Constitution protects economic subsistence rights. z3 Indeed, when
confronted with the argument that they find in the Constitution whatever
they desire to be there, leading liberal nonoriginalists use economic
subsistence rights as an example of a Constitutional provision they would
like to see in the Constitution but is not, alas, there.2 4 Wright, however,
writes that "[wie can responsibly speculate ... that many of those persons
who were excluded from direct influence on the Founders' Constitution,
or on the Civil War amendments, would have been sympathetic to some
culturally appropriate minimal floor of economic provision as a matter of
last resort." '
Another very recent proposal, from an originalist perspective, comes
from McGinnis and Rappaport. They justify respect for some nonoriginalist
precedent based on exclusion-specific nonoriginalism:
[P]recedent should be followed when it corrects a supermajoritarian failure.
Unfortunately, the original supermajoritarian process for enacting the
Constitution had some serious defects, such as the exclusion of blacks and
women. Where a precedent operates to correct the results of these defects,
a strong argument exists for following it.
26
Constitution meant." BORK, supra note 18, at 144. Whether or not they accept Pollack's sug-
gestion, public-meaning originalists should at least explain their position on this issue.
221 Pollack, supra note i i, at 144.
222 Wright, supra note i i, at 703.
223 Id. at 700-03.
224 Id.
225 Id. at 702.
226 John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Oriinalism and Precedent, 103
Nw. U. L. REv. 803, 805 (2009).
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McGinnis and Rappaport argue that in general, courts should hesitate to
attempt to correct "supermajoritarian failures," among other things, because
it may be too difficult to determine what result an actual supermajoritarian
process would have produced."2 7 But when a corrective nonoriginalist
precedent already exists, they believe, the balance of considerations shifts
toward following it."'
C. Evaluation
As suggested in the Introduction, nonoriginalism is a matter of occasion
and a matter of degree."9 When a case involves a constitutional provision
affected by an original exclusion and of special concern to a previously-
excluded class, that might be taken as a particularly good reason to depart
from original meaning. Exclusion-specific cases might also be thought to
justify departing farther from original meaning than would otherwise be
appropriate.
The VMI case, 30 along with other cases applying the Fourteenth
Amendment to gender, 31 could demonstrate in at least two ways how
an exclusion-specific case can be an occasion for nonoriginalism. In this
Article, I have mainly been concerned with the significance of original
exclusions for the interpretation of constitutional provisions ratified in the
antebellum period. With the Reconstruction Amendments, the original
exclusions were to some extent remedied: slavery was eliminated, there
was virtually universal suffrage for white men, and African-American men
in the South began to vote (until they effectively lost that right under
the Jim Crow laws)." 2 Some might believe that the popular-sovereignty
case for originalism is generally strong with respect to the Reconstruction
Amendments, but they might be willing to depart from originalism on
gender-specific issues because women were excluded from the franchise
during Reconstruction. Some might also believe that it is harder to justify
nonoriginalist judicial review (striking down a statute against original
meaning) than nonoriginalist judicial restraint (upholding a statute against
original meaning); they might, however, accept nonoriginalist judicial
review in exclusion-specific cases such as those involving the application
of the Equal Protection Clause to gender.
Exclusion-specific nonoriginalism is both narrower and more powerful
than other nonoriginalist arguments based on the original exclusions.
227 Id. at 841-42.
228 Id. at 842.
229 Seesupra notes I4-i5 and accompanying text.
230 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
231 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,686 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
76 (1971); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
232 See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
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Elsewhere in this Article, I advance arguments based on the original
exclusions in an effort to discredit originalism generally,33 but none of
those arguments purports to justify a departure from original meaning
in any particular case. I argue elsewhere in this Article that the original
exclusions should lead courts to conclude that they are not bound to follow
original meaning;z3 I, of course, do not argue that courts should generally
determine what original meaning provides, and then do the opposite.
Exclusion-specific nonoriginalism, by contrast, does point to particular
kinds of cases, particular occasions on which a nonoriginalist interpretation
might be justified.
As suggested, exclusion-specific nonoriginalism might also justify
a further departure from original meaning than would otherwise be
appropriate. 35 This aspect of exclusion-specific nonoriginalism may
be exemplified by Blaisdel2 36 and Bolling,37 both of which appear to
involve strong departures from original meaning. VMF138 also involves a
strong departure from original meaning under expected-applications
originalism, though it can easily be endorsed by unexpected-applications
originalists 39
What accounts for the widespread intuitive appeal of exclusion-specific
nonoriginalism? There can be a consent-based rationale, a result-based
rationale, or a mix of the two. A straightforward consent-based approach is
that excluded groups (blacks, or women, or the poor) should not be bound
by the original rules because they were not able to participate in making
the original rules. This approach, however, seems to assume a concept of
group rights that many would reject, and so it may not explain the intuitive
force of exclusion-specific nonoriginalism.
A more complicated consent-based rationale might treat exclusion-
specific nonoriginalism as an exception to popular-sovereignty originalism.
Though popular sovereignty at the Founding is a myth, 4° some of us may
be reluctant, as a general matter, to surrender our belief in that myth. We
may be more willing to depart from originalism when the ridiculousness
of popular sovereignty becomes utterly apparent, as with the application
of constitutional provisions to groups that were excluded from any role in
adopting those provisions.
Result-based rationales for exclusion-specific nonoriginalism are
derivative of consent-based defects; they consider consent-based defects
233 See supra Parts I, II, III. See infra Parts V, VI.
234 Id.
235 See discussion supra Part IV(A).
236 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
237 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
238 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
239 See Balkin, supra note 18, at 321-25.
240 See supra Part I.
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as an indication that following original meaning could lead to bad results.
It might be wondered why, under a result-based approach, we should
concern ourselves with consent-based defects at all. Shouldn't we pursue
the interpretive approach that will have the best result, regardless of what
has happened in the past? Insouciance about the past would be a logical
way to proceed, if we were fully confident in our ability to produce the best
results in the future. If, however, we are not fully confident in our ability to
produce the best results, we may take consent-based defects of the past as
a signal of when it is advisable to depart from originalism.
McGinnis and Rappaport offer a rather stark example of such a result-
based approach. As indicated, they believe that the best results are those
that would have been achieved if there had been no "supermajoritarian
failures." 41 McGinnis and Rappaport would pursue counterfactual




I favor a somewhat different result-based approach, one that does not
take originalism to be so strong a default position. The original meaning of
the Constitution, on issues relating to a previously excluded group, is likely
to be unfair to that group because the original meaning was established
during the time of the unfair original exclusion. The original meaning is
likely to embody the unfair exclusionary attitudes that produced the original
exclusion; it is likely to perpetuate the effect of the original exclusion
even after the exclusion has been eliminated.43 This is a result-based
inferential approach, somewhat analogous to the argument from moral
progress I offered above in Part II,144 but considerably more powerful. I
argued above that we should assume that the original meaning of some
antebellum provisions is morally retrograde, 4 simply because those
provisions were generated at the time of greatest exclusion and because
the Constitution is so hard to amend. The inference of morally retrograde
character becomes specific and much stronger when the original meaning
at issue relates specifically to a previously-excluded group.
The view that exclusion-specific nonoriginalism is justified to
avoid perpetuating unfairness does not, I think, impose the same heavy
counterfactual burden that McGinnis and Rappaport's counterfactual-
rectification approach suggests; those who seek to depart from original
meaning do not necessarily have to prove that absent original exclusions,
the rule they favor would have been written into the Constitution as
part of original meaning. In VMI,z46 for example, the exclusion-specific
241 McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 226, at 805.
242 Id.
243 See also Pollack, supra note I I, at 700-I 7; Wright, supra note i i, at 167-69, 173.
244 See supra Part II.
245 Id.
246 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
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nonoriginalist would not necessarily have to show that if women were
enfranchised during Reconstruction, the Fourteenth Amendment would
have explicitly prohibited gender-segregated state military schools 47 It
might be enough to show that the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment (or the original expected application) ratified the subordination
of women as a group excluded from politics.
On the other side, the unfairness-perpetuation approach would allow
the inference of unfairness to be rebutted. For example, the Thirteenth
Amendment was generated largely without the participation of African-
Americans in the South.2 41 This lack of African-American participation
could support an exclusion-specific nonoriginalist argument concerning
the interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment. The exclusion-specific
argument might be resisted, however, on the ground that the Thirteenth
Amendment was designed to benefit African-Americans in the South, even
though it was produced without their participation, so it does not, when
interpreted in originalist fashion, perpetuate the unfairness of an original
exclusion.1
49
If exclusion-specific arguments do not face a full counterfactual
burden, they may liberate us from original meaning, but they may not tell
us the proper nonoriginalist result.5 0 Exclusion-specific nonoriginalism
most convincingly points to a given result when the correct nonoriginalist
decision is obvious, or at least highly prominent, if only originalism can
be rejected. Thus, in Blaisdell, the Court adopted the prominent solution
of judicial restraint after departing from original meaning."5 1 In Bolling,
although the Court did not practice restraint, it also adopted a prominent
solution by harmonizing desegregation law and, more broadly, equal
protection law, across state and federal governments. 25'
Suppose it is accepted that an exclusion-specific case provides an
occasion for nonoriginalism, and indeed for departing farther from original
meaning than would otherwise be appropriate. A remaining question may
be whether the favored nonoriginalist interpretation will in fact be more
beneficial to the previously-excluded group than would be the original
meaning. When a policy seeks to benefit a disadvantaged group, opponents
of the policy often argue that it will in fact harm the group. At times these
arguments have little credibility - even slavery was once justified on the
247 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
248 See KEYSSAR, supra note 4, at 87-91; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 1 i, at 99-159.
249 In suggesting this originalist response, I do not mean to endorse an originalist inter-
pretation of the Thirteenth Amendment.
250 Even under the fully counterfactual approach, it may be impossible to know what a
properly inclusive process would have produced.
251 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448 (934).
252 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,498-500(1954).
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ground that it was better for African-Americans than freedom.2 s3 But at
times the argument is not completely ridiculous: for example, perhaps the
Contract Clause actually benefited generations of debtors by making credit
slightly cheaper.2 4
D. Is the Three-Fourths Rule in Article V Tainted by the Slave Trade?
One exclusion-specific issue deserves separate mention. Some of the
provisions of the antebellum Constitution were inserted to protect slavery,
or to protect the interest of the three deeper-South states in continuing the
African slave trade. 5 Several of these slavery-tainted provisions survived
Reconstruction, and one of them may be the requirement in Article V that
amendments must be approved by three-fourths of the states.
5 6
At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, James Wilson of Pennsylvania
proposed that approval by two-thirds of the states should suffice for
amendments."5 7 Wilson's motion was defeated by a vote of only six to five.
5 8
The six states voting against the motion were Massachusetts, Connecticut,
New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. 59 Wilson then
moved to require approval of three-fourths of the states, which was adopted
unanimously.
216
It appears that much or most of the opposition to Wilson's initial two-
thirds proposal was related to the protection of the African slave trade.
The three deeper-South states that were interested in protecting the
slave trade-North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia-voted as a bloc
against the two-thirds proposal.2 61 This vote occurred before a provision
was inserted in Article V making the protection of the African slave trade
until 1808 completely unamendable;162 that provision was inserted later
on the same day. 63 Moreover, Massachusetts and Connecticut, two of the
three Northern states that voted against the two-thirds proposal, had allied
themselves with the deeper-South states on matters concerning the African
253 See, e.g., GEORGE FITZHUGH, CANNIBALS ALL! OR SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS 220-24 (C.
Vann Woodward ed., I96o).
254 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § IO, cl. I; see also Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 398.
255 See FINKELMAN, supra note Io, at 3-36.
256 See U.S. CONST. art. V; FINKELMAN, supra note Io, at 7-8.
257 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 52, at 558.
258 Id. at 558-59.
259 Id.
26o Id. at 559.
261 Id. at 558-59.
262 "[N]o amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred
and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first
article[.]" U.S. CoNsT. art. V.
263 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 17, at 559.
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slave trade, in order to gain approval for what became the Commerce
Clause."' The votes of Massachusetts and Connecticut against the two-
thirds proposal may have represented a continuation of their support of
the slave-trading interest, although these states may also have had other
concerns.
Z65
In any event, the bloc vote of the deeper-South states suggests that the
Constitution would have been a little easier to amend if it were not for the
interest of some states in protecting the slave trade . 6 6 What implications
does this history have for constitutional interpretation? The difficulty
of amending the Constitution is sometimes offered as a justification for
nonoriginalism, and it might be thought that the case for nonoriginalism is
stronger because the taint of slavery and the slave trade remains on Article
V 67 As before, however, there are complications. There is once again
an issue of counterfactual burden: must the nonoriginalist show that the
Constitution would likely have been amended, under a two-thirds rule, to
depart from original meaning in the way the nonoriginalist now favors? Is
the Commerce Clause itself tainted by the bargain between the deeper-
South states intent on protecting the slave trade and their New England
allies? My own view is that the origin of the three-fourths rule in Article V
adds a little strength to the case for a majoritarian approach as a counter to
both originalist judicial review and nonoriginalist judicial review; it supplies
an additional reason for judicial restraint in the review of federal statutes
and in the review of those state statutes that are common to many states.
V. THE ANTEBELLUM TAINT
I now offer two arguments that may be more radical than anything
I have previously asserted. First, the authority of original meaning is
fundamentally tainted insofar as that authority is said to derive from
a source in the antebellum period. Second, it is, without more, a point
against originalism that originalism would fix the meaning of antebellum
constitutional provisions in the political and legal culture of the antebellum
period.
The Constitution has many sources of moral legitimacy that I endorse,
including contemporary acceptance, acceptance over time, result-based
legitimacy (including the progressive elimination of the original exclusions),
and indirect election of the federal judges who are tasked with interpreting
264 See DAVID BRIAN ROBERTSON, THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAS DESTINY 18o-81
(2005); FINKELMAN, supra note Io, at 27-3 1.
265 Id.
z66 To my knowledge, this history has not previously been discussed in connection with
the originalism debate. Finkelman mentions the three-fourths requirement in Article 5, but
does not discuss it in detail. See FINKELMAN, supra note Io, at 8.
267 U.S. CONST. art. V.
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the Constitution."6  I deny, however, that the Constitution can derive
much moral legitimacy from anything that happened in the antebellum
period, including the Founding. Relative to the Constitution of today, the
Constitution of the antebellum period has a high deficit of consent-based
legitimacy (it was produced by an exclusive slave society) and a high deficit
of result-based legitimacy (it protected slavery). Insofar as the authority of
the Constitution is said to derive from the antebellum period, that authority
is fundamentally tainted by the original exclusions.
Interpretive methods, like the Constitution itself, can have or lack
moral legitimacy. Just as the authority of the Constitution is tainted insofar
as it derives from antebellum sources, so is the authority of originalism and
original meaning.
The present argument that the antebellum-derived authority of
original meaning is fundamentally tainted is an extension of the argument
I offered in Part I and was, in fact, prefigured there. I argued in Part I
that the original exclusions defeat any justification for originalism that
relies on democratic theory and notions of popular sovereignty.169 I there
noted that under some conceptions of democracy or popular sovereignty,
the antebellum Constitution's substantive accommodation with slavery, in
the Fugitive Slave Clause and other provisions, might not be considered
a democratic deficit;7 0 the democratic legitimacy of the Constitution,
it might be thought, depends only on the processes that produced it. 71
Further, I noted, the fact that the Constitution was produced by a slave
society might even be deemed irrelevant to the democratic provenance of
the Constitution. 7 ' But while rejecting any conception of democracy that
deemed it irrelevant that the Constitution was produced by a slave society
and substantively protected slavery, I also noted that these features of the
antebellum Constitution clearly affect its moral legitimacy. 73 Now I make a
more generalized argument: the original exclusions rebut any justifications
for originalism, not just democratic-theoretical justifications, that seek to
trace the authority of original meaning to the antebellum period.
What justifications for originalism, then, other than those based on
popular sovereignty, does the argument against antebellum-derived
authority address? Primarily, it addresses justifications for originalism
based on theories of meaning, interpretation, or legal authority, discussed in
Part VI below. As noted there, however, the argument against antebellum-
derived authority does not directly confront such theories; it assumes that
268 See supra Parts II and III.






their claims of originalist necessity are false. 7 4
While the authority of original meaning is tainted insofar as it derives
from an antebellum source, it need not derive from an antebellum source;
there are many putative justifications for originalism that are unaffected
by the present argument. If the originalist method produced good results
for contemporary people (a supposition I doubt), original meaning would
enjoy result-based moral legitimacy. If a presidential candidate were
elected after campaigning on a promise to appoint originalist judges,
original meaning would enjoy indirect democratic legitimacy. Originalism
can make increasingly persuasive claims based on popular sovereignty
for constitutional amendments ratified as the original exclusions were
eliminated. In all such cases, some nonoriginalist arguments might still have
weight (including arguments based on original exclusions), but originalism
could claim a source of authority untainted by the original exclusions.
Thus, the argument against antebellum-derived authority affects major
versions of originalism, but not all of them.
A second kind of antebellum taint does attach to all varieties of
originalism, as it relates not to the antebellum origin of the supposed
authority of original meaning, but to the fixation of meaning in the
antebellum period. Constitutional interpretation requires us to decide
whether we will allow the meaning of older provisions to evolve or whether
we will hold constitutional meaning fixed at the time of adoption. And
the time of adoption, for antebellum provisions, is the time of greatest
exclusion. However good may be the case for allowing the evolution of
constitutional meaning, based on all the various nonoriginalist arguments, I
submit that there is an additional, general point in favor of nonoriginalism:
if the meaning of antebellum provisions cannot evolve, the meaning of
those provisions will remain fixed in the political and legal culture of an
exclusionary slave society.
Originalism is tied to the political and legal culture of the antebellum
Constitution. That culture is morally illegitimate, from a contemporary
perspective, in that it protected slavery and excluded most of the
population from politics. Even if we assume that a contested provision
was not itself the result of original exclusions, and even if we reject the
public choice-type argument that the original meaning of some provisions
is likely to retard moral progress, and even if originalism can claim some
source of authority that is not itself tainted by the original exclusions, still
the unattractiveness of fixing meaning in antebellum culture gives us some
reason to reject originalism.
There has been debate recently over whether it is proper for
American courts to look to foreign law in interpreting the Constitution.
274 See infra Part VI.
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In his dissenting opinion in Atkins v. Virginia,75 Justice Scalia rejected a
consideration of foreign law, and made, in passing, a pejorative reference to
the legal systems of other countries: "Equally irrelevant are the practices
of the 'world community,' whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not
always those of our people.1
7 6
It does seem that when a court proposes to look to foreign law,
certain unsavory features of the foreign legal system can counsel caution.
Suppose that an American court sought to support its interpretation of the
Constitution by citing the law of a foreign country that permitted slavery,
whose constitution actually protected the institution of slavery, and in which
the vast majority of people were excluded from suffrage. This would not
be a very persuasive reference to foreign law, even if the law in question
had no apparent relationship to the unsavory aspects of the foreign legal
system. 7'
The analogy is, of course, inexact and overblown. Still, there is a sense in
which the legal and political culture of antebellum America is (thankfully)
foreign to us, and the meaning of the Constitution should not be fixed in
that period.
The argument against antebellum stasis is stronger as to expected
applications than as to original meaning (assuming one believes the two can
be separated). An original expected application that is not part of original
meaning is more obviously part of a time-bound culture. For example, if
one believes that the expected application of the Eighth Amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishments is severable from the original meaning
of the term "cruel and unusual punishments,"118 the expected application
would clearly be more of a time-bound part of antebellum culture than
would the original meaning.
In this Part, I have argued that the authority of original meaning
is tainted insofar as it derives from an antebellum source, and that
constitutional meaning should not be fixed in the political and legal
culture of an exclusionary slave society. Unlike prior arguments, such as
the rejection of Whittington's reciprocal originalism and McGinnis and
Rappaport's consequentialist originalism, the two I have offered in this Part
can claim no syllogistic verity; you buy them or you don't. Originalists will
not buy them, but for nonoriginalists, they may enunciate more clearly the
intuitive sense that the original exclusions support a fairly general rejection
275 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
276 Id.. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
277 Justice Breyer, who believes reference to foreign law is acceptable, has admitted
some embarrassment at citing a decision from a court in Zimbabwe: "I think I may have made
what I call a tactical error in citing a case from Zimbabwe-not the human rights capital of the
world. (Laughter.) But it was at an earlier time-Judge Gubei (ph) was a very good judge."
Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 178.
278 U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
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of originalism.
VI. "HARD" ORIGINALISM AND ORIGINAL EXCLUSIONS
Originalists often rely on theories of meaning and interpretation, or
theories about the nature of legal authority, to argue that the only way
to interpret the Constitution is according to its original meaning. A legal
interpretation of the Constitution that departs from its original meaning,
they often say, is not in fact an interpretation at all. 79 They further claim
that the correctness of original-meaning interpretation does not depend
on any considerations of political morality. Following are representative
statements of such views:
Randy Barnett: "We are bound [by original meaning] because we
today-right here, right now-profess our commitment to a written
constitution, and original meaning interpretation follows inexorably from
that commitment."
2 80
Robert Bork: "If the Constitution is law, then presumably its meaning,
like that of all other law, is the meaning the lawmakers were understood to
have intended.... There is no other sense in which the Constitution can
be what article VI proclaims it to be: 'Law.'
281
Lawrence Solum: "[The] semantic content of the Constitution (the
linguistic meaning of the Constitution) is fixed at the time of adoption."' '
Keith Whittington: "[T]he meaning of a text derives from the author,
not from the reader. An interpreter may succeed or fail in understanding a
text, but the original meaning is the meaning to be interpreted."1
83
Berman uses the term "hard originalism" to describe this approach.
2 14
For the sake of uniformity, I will largely accede to Berman's usage, though I
would prefer a different term: "Borgian originalism." The term "Borgian"
is not a misspelled reference to Robert Bork. It is, rather, a reference to the
relentless cyborgs in the Star Trek universe, who make statements such
as "Resistance is futile; you must comply," and who dismiss the values of
other species as "irrelevant." One motto of hard or Borgian originalism
could be "Moral legitimacy is irrelevant; you must comply."
Theorists who advocate hard originalism often have separate arguments
based on considerations of moral legitimacy or arguments that are at least
sensitive to such considerations. Thus, Whittington's hard originalism is
279 Solum, supra note 18, at 67-69. Balkin has given partial support to this view. Balkin,
Framework Originalism, supra note 2o, at 559-60. I do not adopt this tendentious convention as
to the term "interpretation," as it comes close to assuming the correctness of originalism.
280 Barnett, supra note 18, at 636.
281 BORK, supra note 18, at 145.
282 Solum, supra note 18, at 2 (emphasis in original).
283 Whittington, The New Originalism, supra note 17, at 61o.
284 Berman, supra note 12, at 6; see also id. at 37.
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supplemented by an appeal to popular sovereignty, 85 Bork's is supplemented
by an appeal to democracy,"8 6 and Barnett's is supplemented by an appeal
to libertarian political theory.8 7 But in their hard originalist aspect, these
theorists do indeed claim that moral legitimacy is irrelevant;", once the
Constitution is acknowledged to be legally binding, for whatever reason,
the only possible interpretation is an originalist one.z89
For hard originalists, any accretion to the moral legitimacy of the
Constitution inures to the benefit of originalism. If the elimination of
original exclusions-abolition of slavery and expansion of the franchise-
increases the moral legitimacy of the Constitution, that simply gives people
additional reason to treat the Constitution as law, which, in turn, necessarily
requires that provisions of the antebellum Constitution be given the same
meaning they had when the original exclusions were in effect.
As noted in the Introduction of this Article, originalists disagree among
themselves as to whether they should uphold the original intent of the
framers, the original understanding of the ratifiers, or the original public
meaning. Hard originalism seems to best fit framer-intentionalism.
Offhand, it seems more plausible to argue that the only possible meaning
is the drafters' intended meaning than to argue that the only plausible
meaning is the meaning as understood by a particular group of ratifiers or by
hypothetical people of a certain period. The greater superficial plausibility
of intentionalist hard originalism may explain why Whittington refers to
authorship in his hard originalist aspect, even though he would actually
uphold the understanding of the ratifiers, consistent with his theory of
popular sovereignty.z90
Recently, however, Solum has offered an important argument that the
only possible meaning of the Constitution is its original public meaning.
Solum concludes:
The success conditions for framers meaning were not met when the
United States Constitution was proposed, ratified, and implemented. So
285 WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 36.
286 BORK, supra note I8, at 143.
287 BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 21, at 32-89, 253-73.
288 The only issue of political morality that hard originalists are prepared to recognize is
whether one should obey the law or obey the Constitution. See Barnett, supra note 18, at 636;
Solum, supra note 18, at io.
289 See Barnett, supra note 18, at 636; Solum, supra note 18, at so.
290 See WHrrTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 17, at 36 ("ratifying
intent"); Whittington, TheNew Onginalism, supra note 17, at 6Io ("As the founders themselves
noted, the constitutional text is meaningless unless and until it is ratified. It is the adoption
of the text by the public that renders the text authoritative, not its drafting by particular
individuals.").
One could say that the ratifiers are actually the authors of the text; but that way of posing
the issue has a number of problems, including that it is false as a matter of fact.
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the meaning of the Constitution cannot be understood on the model of
speakers meaning.... It is not that we chose not to attribute framers meaning
to the Constitution. Rather, it is that the Constitution does nothave framers
meaning.2 9'
As a nonoriginalist, I welcome any contentiousness among hard
originalists of different kinds.9 2 Contentions that two different versions of
original meaning are necessary interpretations suggest that neither may be
a necessary one.
My short response to hard originalism is that the Constitution obviously
can be interpreted in a nonoriginalist fashion, since it has been interpreted
in a nonoriginalist fashion. While hard originalists purport to offer theories
that are impervious to considerations of political morality, in fact their
theories seem to rely on intensely normative, political, and contestable
conceptions of what fidelity to the Constitution requires. This, of course, is
just a conclusory verdict. Each hard originalist theory must be confronted
on its own terms, something that is beyond the scope of this Article. Berman
and others have undertaken this effort, and I endorse their (nonoriginalist)
conclusions. 93 I will not here undertake a general refutation of hard
originalism, but will instead consider how various nonoriginalist arguments
based on the original exclusions apply to hard originalism.
There are several avenues through which arguments about original
exclusions can address hard originalism. To a limited extent, arguments
about original exclusions can play a role within the framework of hard
originalist theory. Some hard originalists are willing to recognize a
meaningful distinction between original meaning and original expected
application.2 4 They believe that the Constitution must be interpreted in
accordance with original meaning, but that no such necessity attaches to
original expected application. Such a hard originalist theory could accept
arguments about original exclusions as a reason to deviate from original
expected applications. The arguments that might be accepted most
readily, in this regard, are exclusion-specific arguments-for example, the
argument that original expectations should not control the operation of the
Equal Protection Clause in sex-discrimination cases because women were
291 Solum, supra note 18, at 50.
292 The dispute between them is like a confrontation between two rival Borg colonies:
"Resistance is futile; you must comply."
"No, your resistance is futile; you must comply."
"No, your resistance is futile; you must comply."
293 Berman, supra note 12, at 37-68 (focusing on intentionalism); see also Frederick
Schauer, Defining Originalism, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POI'y 343 (1995) (same).
294 See supra note 23.
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disenfranchised when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
Even when the issue is framed as one of original meaning rather than
original expected application, exclusion-specific arguments might be
pressed within the framework of hard originalist theory. Hard originalists
typically leave open the possibility of nonoriginalist interpretation if only
it is given another (often pejorative) description."' 5 Solum, for example,
distinguishes between the Constitution and constitutional law." He
claims that the Constitution can only be interpreted in originalist fashion,
but he concedes that constitutional law can have nonoriginalist elements. 97
Accordingly, arguments about original exclusions might be deployed, within
the framework of Solum's theory, to urge that constitutional law be to some
extent nonoriginalist.
This is only a narrow avenue, however. Hard originalists have such
a strong commitment to originalist methodology that even limited
nonoriginalist considerations cannot easily gain a hearing. Perhaps a
hard originalist could be persuaded to allow some limited exception to
originalism based on exclusion-specific arguments, but that is unlikely to
happen very often.
Other nonoriginalist arguments based on the original exclusions cannot
claim a place in hard originalist theory, but they can still be urged against
hard originalism. In Parts II and III, I argued that the moral legitimacy of
the Constitution derives in part from nonoriginalism. In Part V, I argued that
the meaning of antebellum constitutional provisions should not be fixed
in the legal and political culture of an exclusionary slave society. These
arguments apply to all versions of originalism, including hard originalism.
I also argued, in Part V, that the authority of the Constitution, or of a
method of constitutional interpretation, is tainted insofar as it is said to
derive from the antebellum period. This argument does not apply to all
versions oforiginalism, but it does apply to hard originalism. Hard originalists
believe that whenever a provision becomes part of the Constitution, the
original meaning of that provision gains supreme interpretive authority.2
gs
Hard originalists therefore think that the authority of the original meaning
of antebellum provisions derives from the antebellum period.2 99
All these various arguments based on the original exclusions do not
directly confront the hard originalist insistence that originalist interpretation
is necessary. For those who are not fully prepared to accept such claims of
295 Berman, supra note 12, at 12-14.
296 Solum, supra note 18, at IO9.
297 Id.
298 See supra notes 279-84 and accompanying text.
299 The argument against antebellum-derived authority may apply less to Solum than to
other hard originalists because Solum believes that the obligation to follow original meaning
exists only insofar as original meaning is law, and that the status of original meaning as law
depends on its contemporary acceptance as law. Solum, supra note 18, at 135.
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originalist necessity, however, the exclusion-based arguments may have
some impact.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have set one kind of backward-looking consideration-
the illegitimacy of original exclusions-against the backward-looking
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. My ideal outcome,
I confess, is the mutual exhaustion of backward-looking considerations.
I feel the intuitive appeal of backward-looking considerations, both
originalist and nonoriginalist, but ultimately I align myself with those who
would interpret the Constitution so as best to promote the well-being of
the living.3°° The troubling illegitimacy of original exclusions, I hope, will
counteract the appeal of originalism, leaving the field clearer for forward-
looking approaches.
I noted in the Introduction to this Article that a major issue dividing
originalists is the extent to which original meaning includes original
expected applications.3 °0 In advancing various arguments based on the
original exclusions, I have for the most part assumed a traditional conception
of original meaning, under which original meaning does include a fair
amount of original expected application. While this traditional conception
is probably still dominant, among both originalists and nonoriginalists,3 °0
there is now a vigorous new movement of unexpected-applications
originalists who advocate a minimalist conception of original meaning. I
now consider the relevance of my arguments to unexpected-applications
originalism. Doing so will provide a review of the various arguments based
on the original exclusions, as well as addressing their significance to an
important new strain in originalist theory.
30 3
The original exclusions powerfully undercut justifications for originalism
that rely on normative democratic theory or notions of popular sovereignty.
If unexpected-applications originalism relies on popular sovereignty,
it, too, is undercut by the original exclusions. Suppose, however, that
unexpected-applications originalists do not base their approach on popular
sovereignty.3  Then the original exclusions furnish them with an argument
300 See, e.g., Brest, supra note I t, at 226 ("Having abandoned both consent and fidelity
to the text and original understanding as the touchstones of constitutional decisionmaking,
let me propose a designedly vague criterion: How well, compared to possible alternatives,
does the practice contribute to the well-being of our society-or, more narrowly, to the ends of
constitutional government?").
301 Seesupra Introduction.
302 See FALLON, supra note z8, at 15; Monaghan, supra note 27, at 739.
303 I address some related issues in Mark S. Stein, The Domestic Violence Clause in "New
Originalist" Theory, 37 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 129 (2009).
304 This seems to be the case with Balkin, Barnett, and Solum, though Whittington, who
is partly in the unexpected-applications originalist camp, does rely on popular sovereignty.
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against those expected-applications originalists who do rely on popular
sovereignty.
The theory of popular sovereignty seems most consistent with a
detailed understanding of original meaning. If we apply a constitutional
provision in a way that is very different from original expectations, are we
not thwarting the will of the People? Expected-applications originalists
can argue that we must respect original expectations because they were the
expectations of the People. But unexpected-applications originalists can
respond that the expectations were not those of the People, but of a small
and privileged minority in a slave society.
Similarly, the original exclusions provide unexpected-applications
originalists with a ready counter to McGinnis and Rappaport. Based on
their theory that supermajority rules produce good results, McGinnis and
Rappaport explicitly reject unexpected-applications originalism; they
argue that original expected applications should normally be respected.3"5
But since there was in fact no supermajority approval for the provisions
of the antebellum Constitution, McGinnis and Rappaport's theoretical
defense of expected-applications originalism has no validity.
I have argued that the mirror image of McGinnis and Rappaport's
argument is more valid: as the antebellum Constitution had morally
retrograde provisions, and as the Constitution is so hard to amend, it makes
sense to assume that some morally retrograde provisions remain (perhaps
along with morally retrograde omissions). This argument from moral
progress is less persuasive against unexpected-applications originalism,
with its minimalist conception of original meaning: such a conception allows
the Constitution to undergo moral progress without formal amendment.
Moreover, unexpected-applications originalists can once again adopt the
argument for their own use; they can argue that a refusal to depart from
original expectations frustrates moral progress.
The elimination of the original exclusions, I have argued, has increased
the result-based moral legitimacy of the Constitution. It has also increased
the consent-based moral legitimacy of the Constitution: each inclusion of a
previously-excluded group was controversial at one point, but subsequently
gained wide acceptance. I have argued that since the original exclusions
were eliminated, in part, through nonoriginalist means, the moral legitimacy
of the Constitution is based in part on nonoriginalist doctrine. Therefore,
I have suggested, future nonoriginalism may require less justification than
originalists believe.
Unexpected-applications originalists may respond that the elimination
of the original exclusions was accomplished through measures that
deviated from original expected application, but not from original meaning.
See supra Part I.
305 See McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Interpretive Prindples, supra note 23, at 378-79;
McGinnis & Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism, supra note 23.
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Therefore, they may argue, the moral legitimacy of the Constitution is
based in part on unexpected-applications originalism; it is not based on
nonoriginalism. This unexpected-applications originalist position seems
somewhat plausible. I would agree that a minimalist conception of original
meaning can easily support inclusive liberal precedents that are often
considered nonoriginalist, such as Brown.3°6 I am more skeptical that even a
minimalist conception of original meaning can justify the coercive measures
used to gain ratification of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments;3 7
only nonoriginalism, I suspect, can fully justify these constitutional
improvements. Even so, however, we could confront a situation, under
unexpected-applications originalism, in which the only nonoriginalist
behavior that contributed to the moral legitimacy of the Constitution
was political nonoriginalism rather than judicial nonoriginalism. In that
situation, I have suggested, it could be more legitimately wondered whether
past political nonoriginalism supports future judicial nonoriginalism.
In Part IV above, I discussed exclusion-specific cases-cases involving
a previously-excluded class and an exclusion-affected constitutional
provision. Nonoriginalists may use such cases as an occasion for departing
from original meaning, or as an occasion for departing farther from original
meaning than they might otherwise want to do. Similarly, unexpected-
applications originalists may use exclusion-specific cases as an occasion for
departing from original expected application, or as an occasion for departing
farther from original expected application than they might otherwise want
to do.
Some exclusion-specific cases can be seen by unexpected-applications
originalists as being a rejection only of expected application and not a
rejection of original meaning. Other exclusion-specific cases, however,
cannot so easily be accepted by unexpected-applications originalists. As
noted, two cases that have been justified on the ground of exclusion-specific
nonoriginalism-Bolling3°8 and Blaisdell39---involve strong departures from
originalism; it is questionable whether unexpected-applications originalism
can accommodate them.31 0 This raises the question whether unexpected-
applications originalists would ever be prepared to make an exception in
exclusion-specific cases.
In Part V above, I argued that that the authority of original meaning is
tainted insofar as it derives from any antebellum source. This argument
against all antebellum-derived authority, like the more limited argument
against antebellum popular sovereignty, would seem to apply both to
306 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
307 See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
308 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
309 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
310 Solum does suggest that the result in Bolling may be consistent with the original
meaning of the Ninth Amendment. Solum, supra note 18, at 138.
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expected-applications originalism and to unexpected-applications
originalism. I also argued in Part V that the meaning of the Constitution
should not be fixed in the legal and political culture of the exclusionary
slave society that was antebellum America. As previously observed, this
argument against stasis in antebellum culture is stronger as applied to
expected applications than as applied to a hard core of original meaning;
an original expected application that is not part of original meaning is more
obviously part of a time-bound legal and political culture. And once again,
unexpected-applications originalists can adopt this argument as a reason
not to be bound by expected applications. They can argue that to give
original expectations the force of law is to bind ourselves, unnecessarily, to
the expectations of an exclusionary slave society.
In sum, the various arguments based on the original exclusions are not
as effective against unexpected-applications originalism as they are against
expected-applications originalism (which is not to say they are no good at
all against unexpected-applications originalism). Moreover, unexpected-
applications originalists can adopt, in modified form, some of the arguments
based on original exclusions.
Unexpected-applications originalism is a welcome development in
originalist theory. I am not prepared to sign on to it because I believe it
still leaves constitutional interpretation too much the hostage of the past.
I would not take it amiss, however, if my arguments were seen to support
unexpected-applications originalism as an alternative to expected-
applications originalism.

